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Unpopular Constitutionalism
MILA VERSTEEG*
Constitutions are commonly thought to express nations’ highest values. They
are often proclaimed in the name of “We the People” and are regarded—by
scholars and the general public alike—as an expression of the people’s views and
values. This Article shows empirically that this widely held image of constitutions
does not correspond with the reality of constitution making around the world. The
Article contrasts the constitutional-rights choices of ninety countries between 1981
and 2010 with data from nearly one-half million survey responses on cultural,
religious, and social values conducted over the same period. It finds, surprisingly,
that in this period, the link between nations’ specific constitutional choices and
their citizens’ values has generally been weak or nonexistent. The Article presents
additional evidence from an original survey that reveals that, overwhelmingly,
people want to enshrine their values in their constitution. Together, these findings
suggest that the world’s constitutions are not meaningfully supported by the people
they represent and that the global practice of constitution-making can be
characterized as an exercise in “unpopular constitutionalism.”
The Article attributes this finding to a dilemma that lies at the heart of
constitutional design. When constitutions serve as unique and defining statements
of national ideals and popular values, they may flout universal human rights norms
or well-established principles of constitutional design. On the other hand, when
constitutional rules merely reflect sound constitutional design and universal right
norms, they may be remote from the people’s values and traditions and therefore
fail in practice. The findings suggest that constitution-makers have largely resolved
this dilemma in favor of universal rights and ready-made constitutional models,
which explains the disconnect from popular values.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional values are often at odds with popular values. When South
Africa’s 1996 post-apartheid constitution was written, 88% of all South Africans
considered homosexuality to be morally unacceptable,1 but the new constitution
nonetheless guaranteed equal protection regardless of sexual orientation.2 By
contrast, the Netherlands, where only 22% of the population opposes
homosexuality, has never protected gay rights in its constitution.3 In Morocco, a
recent opinion poll revealed that 95% of the population would not go on a legal
strike under any circumstance,4 even though its constitution proclaims that the right
to strike is one of the nation’s highest values.5 By contrast, 99% of the British
population was willing to go on strike, but the right to strike lacks constitutional
status in British law.6 In the Dominican Republic, 86% of the population wanted a

1. World Values Survey Ass’n, World Values Survey 1981–2008 Official Aggregate
v.20090901 (2009), http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSData.jsp; see infra Table 1 for
details on the survey question related to homosexuality.
2. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9(3) (“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”).
3. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1.
4. Id.; see infra Table 1 for details on the survey question related to the right to strike.
5. ROYAUME DU MAROC [CONSTITUTION], Sept. 13, 1996, art. 14 (Morocco) (“The
right of strike shall be guaranteed.”).
6. The overwhelming majority of countries analyzed in this Article have a written
constitution that consists of a single document. The British Constitution is different,
however, in that it consists of unwritten conventions and judicial interpretations, as well as
legislation that enjoys semi-constitutional status. See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 22 (8th ed. 1915) (defining a constitution as “all
rules which directly or indirectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign
power in the state”). For the purpose of the analysis presented in this Article, the following
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stronger protection of the natural environment—even at the expense of higher
taxes7—but the constitutional document is silent on environmental protection. By
contrast, a right to a healthy environment is enshrined in the Lithuanian
Constitution,8 even though no more than 24% of Lithuanians were willing to pay
for increased environmental protection.9
Such disconnects between constitutional texts and popular values stand in stark
contrast with how constitutions are perceived by constitutional scholars and the
general public alike. Ever since nations have been writing constitutions, these
documents have been conceptualized as social contracts between the people and
their government, rooted in the “consent of the governed.”10 Today, constitutions
are commonly proclaimed in the name of “We the People”11 and are often
approved by popular referendum.12 Constitutional scholars routinely claim that one
of the leading goals of constitutional law is to articulate, preserve, or construct the
highest values of the nation and its people.13

documents were considered to be constitutional ones: Magna Carta, 1297, 25 Edw. 1, cc. 1,
9, 29; Habeas Corpus Act, 1640, 16 Car. 1, c. 10; Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2;
Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2; Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13; Human
Rights Act, 1998, c. 42; Freedom of Information Act, 2000, c. 36. The right to strike is not
enshrined in any of these documents, nor does it enjoy constitutional status through judicial
law making or conventions. See Federico Fabbrini, Europe in Need of a New Deal: On
Federalism, Free Market, and the Right to Strike, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1175, 1191–94 (2012)
(describing the U.K. government’s refusal to recognize the strike as a right, instead of
treating it as a statutory freedom).
7. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1; see infra Table 1 for details on the
survey question related to environmental values.
8. LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS KONSTITUCIJA [CONSTITUTION], Oct. 25, 1992, art. 53 (Lith.)
(“The State and each person must protect the environment from harmful influences.”); id.
art. 54 (“The State shall take care of the protection of the natural environment, wildlife and
plants, individual objects of nature and areas of particular value and shall supervise a
sustainable use of natural resources, their restoration and increase.”).
9. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident . . . . That . . . [g]overnments . . . deriv[e] their just powers from the
consent of the governed . . . .”).
11. Denis J. Galligan, The Sovereignty Deficit in Modern Constitutions, 33 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 702, 707 (2013) (showing that a majority of democratic constitutions are
proclaimed in the name of the people).
12. See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of
Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 201, 207 fig.1 (2009)
(documenting, empirically, that over 40% of all constitutions today require approval by
popular referendum).
13. See, e.g., BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL
FUNCTIONALITY 5 (2009) (noting that the primary function of constitutions is to “imagine
and then help to realize a shared collective existence”); ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG &
JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 38 (2009) (noting that a
“function that constitutions serve is the symbolic one of defining the nation and its goals”);
VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 155 (2009)
(describing constitutions as “forms of national self-expression, providing the framework for
the working out within a particular ‘nomos’ of its contests, commitments, and identity”
(citation omitted)); GARY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 3 (2010) (arguing that one
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Most contemporary constitutional theorists—including both popular
constitutionalists and judicial supremacists—believe that constitutions ought to
enjoy larger democratic legitimacy than ordinary legislation. Popular
constitutionalists see constitutions as documents created both by the people and for
the people.14 They argue not only that constitutions should reflect popular values,15
but also that “the people themselves” should interpret and implement them.16 While
popular interpretation and implementation might be controversial, the view that
constitutions should reflect popular values is not.17 Even defenders of judicial
supremacy think that constitutions should reflect the people’s highest values. These
theorists build on the normative claim that, in order to solve the
counter-majoritarian difficulty inherent in constitutional adjudication, constitutions
ought to be more democratic than ordinary legislation.18 They claim that
constitutions should be made in special moments of “higher lawmaking,” in which
the people come together, transcend their ordinary short-sighted interests, and
articulate their highest aspirations and most deeply held values.19 Under this logic,
constitutions represent reasoned deliberation by the people, while ordinary
legislation represents the short-sighted bargaining, fears, and passions of elected
representatives.20 The invalidation of ordinary legislation that contradicts the
of the core functions of constitutional law is to articulate the nation’s distinct identity);
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE
RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (2008) (“Expressivism suggests that a
nation has a (single) self-understanding that its constitution expresses.” (emphasis in
original)); Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, Constitutions as Expressive Documents, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 329, 333–38 (Barry Weingast & Donald
A. Wittman eds., 2006) (emphasizing that written constitutions express national
self-understanding); Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on
the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 648–50 (1999)
(suggesting that, amongst other things, constitutions serve to express national identity);
H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African
Political Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 65, 65–66 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) (noting that
constitutions are inextricably linked to sovereignty and proclaim the nation’s highest values).
14. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW passim (2004) (suggesting that “popular constitutionalism” entails a
continuous involvement of the people in the writing, interpretation, and implementation of
the constitutional document).
15. See id. at 7 (describing the Constitution as “fundamentally, an act of popular will:
the people’s charter, made by the people”).
16. Id. at 7–8 (suggesting that for most of American history “‘the people
themselves’ . were responsible for seeing that [the Constitution] was properly interpreted
and implemented”).
17. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The People’s Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A32
(suggesting that giving people the last word over the constitution is “taking the law out of
constitutional law” and “if constitutional law were but a vessel into which the people could
pour whatever they wanted it to contain at any given moment” the whole point of framing a
constitution will be lost).
18. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 6 (1991).
19. Id.
20. Id. (emphasizing that constitutions are written by the people, while ordinary
legislation is written by the people’s elected representatives); see also JOHN FINN,
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constitution, while undemocratic at face value, merely channels the true will of the
people.21 With a constitution, “Peter sober binds Peter drunk,” so the story goes.22
Thus, the one idea that unites otherwise divided schools of constitutional thought is
that a nation’s highest document should reflect the will of the people.
The general public also commonly perceives the constitution as an articulation
of its ideals and values. To illustrate, the American Tea Party movement claims
that the Constitution reflects America’s highest values, and it has mobilized to
protect those values from what it considers to be an intrusive Congress.23 Similar
claims permeate the constitutional discourse of other countries. From a wave of
recent radical populist constitutions in Latin America,24 to the 2011 Hungarian
constitution, to the newly written Egyptian constitution, claims of popular values
and identity often surround the adoption of new constitutional documents.25
This Article suggests that these widely held images of the nature of
constitutional law do not correspond with the reality of constitution-making around
the world. Drawing on an original dataset that spans the right-related contents of all
national constitutions, the Article shows that constitutions do not usually align with
popular opinion. Specifically, the Article contrasts countries’ choices on
constitutional rights between 1981 and 2010 with data from nearly one-half million
household surveys on people’s cultural, religious, and social values in ninety
countries from the same period. The analysis reveals that there is generally no
connection between specific constitutional choices and popular opinion.26 For
instance, popular opinion on homosexuality does not correlate with constitutional
protection of gay rights, popular opinion on abortion does not correlate with

CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (1991) (quoting
John Potter Stockton’s position in debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871:
“[c]onstitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in their sane moments that they
may not die by a suicidal hand in the day of their frenzy” (citation omitted)); Jon Elster,
Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35, 35–45 (George
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (conceptualizing constitutional commitment as a time
inconsistency problem whereby rational pre-commitments enshrined in the constitution are
to govern later moments of fear and passion).
21. ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that a normal electoral victory does not give
politicians the “mandate to enact an ordinary statute that overturns the considered judgments
previously reached by the People”).
22. STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSION AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
GOVERNMENT 135 (1995) (suggesting that the constitution represents “Peter sober” while
ordinary legislation represents “Peter drunk”).
23. See Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party
Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 288, 292 (2011) (“The Tea Party movement
locates the fundamental principles that form the American character in the Constitution, and
it argues that only a revival of these principles can save the nation from ruin.” (citation
omitted)).
24. See Phoebe King, Neo-Bolivarian Constitutional Design, in THE SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 366, 367 (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds.,
2013) (describing the recent constitutions of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia as radical
populist documents).
25. See infra Part VI.C (describing claims of national identity and popular values
context of the new Hungarian and Egyptian constitutions).
26. See infra Part III.
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constitutional protection of the unborn, and popular opinion on the environment
does not correlate with constitutional protection of the environment.
What is more, it turns out that most people do not want their constitution to be
disconnected from their values. This Article presents additional findings from an
original survey developed by the author and circulated among over a thousand
respondents from different countries. Although the sample size is too small to draw
any definite conclusions, the survey reveals that people generally do prefer their
constitution do reflect their values. This finding therefore suggests that a significant
discrepancy exists between what people want from their constitution and what the
document actually provides. The global practice of constitution-making, this Article
suggests, is characterized by unpopular constitutionalism.
This Article attributes this finding to a dilemma that lies at the heart of
constitutional design.27 Constitutional theory notwithstanding, for those writing a
constitution, the constitution is not only a forum to express popular values, but also
an instrument to articulate and protect universal human rights norms, and a tool to
design the nation. In several ways, these different objectives can be inconsistent
with each other. When constitutions serve as unique and defining statements of
national ideals and values, they may flout universal human rights norms or
well-established principles of constitutional design. At the same time, where
constitutional rules merely reflect sound constitutional design and universal values,
they may be remote from the people’s values and traditions and fail in practice. The
empirical data presented in this Article suggest that constitution-makers have
resolved the dilemma in favor of universal rights and ready-made constitutional
models, which explains constitutions’ disconnect from popular values.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I conceptualizes how
popular values are reflected in national constitutions. It draws attention to
preambles, participatory procedures, and bills of rights as modes to express a
commitment to popular views and values, and it explains why the focus of this
Article is on how constitutional-rights choices reflect popular values.
Part II introduces the data used to examine the connection between popular
opinion and constitutions. Part III.A and Part III.B explore whether countries
whose people deeply hold certain values are more likely to enshrine those values in
their constitutions. This Part’s main finding is that cross-country differences in
popular values do not explain cross-country differences in constitutional rights.
Part IV explores to what extent each national constitution aligns with popular
values. Part IV.A calculates, for each country in each year, the degree to which that
country’s constitution aligns with popular values and ranks the world’s
constitutions according to their populist nature. Part IV.B reveals that constitutional
populism is not random, but that some types of countries are more likely to possess
unpopular constitutions than others. Specifically, it finds that younger constitutions
and more comprehensive constitutions are more likely to align with popular
opinion than constitutions that are old or sparse. It also finds that constitutional
populism has an aspirational character: countries in which constitutional
commitments remain unfulfilled are most likely to possess populist constitutions.

27. See infra Part VI.C (introducing the dilemma).
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Part V presents an original survey of over one thousand people from eleven
countries and explores whether people prefer to enshrine their values in their
constitution. The survey suggests that the overwhelming majority of respondents
do want their constitution to represent their values, which suggests that the
disconnect between constitutional choices and popular values implies an unpopular
constitutionalism, whereby a substantial portion of the world’s constitutions do not
enshrine the values of the people they are supposed to represent. Part V.B focuses
on American respondents only and how they perceive their constitution. It shows
that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Americans are more reluctant to demand
rights of a socioeconomic nature, even when those rights align with their values.
Based on this insight, this Part reassesses how popular the U.S. Constitution
actually is.
Part VI sets forth possible explanations for unpopular constitutionalism. It
suggests that real-world constitution-makers are not merely concerned with writing
documents that reflect popular values, but also face competing considerations.
Functionalism and universalism are two such competing considerations that may
steer constitution-makers away from popular self-expression. This Article
concludes by reflecting on the implications of its core findings for contemporary
constitutional theory.
I. CONSTITUTIONS AS POPULIST DOCUMENTS
Even though constitutions are commonly conceptualized as expressions of
popular views and values, different scholars use the idea of popular self-expression
to mean substantially different things. Indeed, the literature is characterized by a
variety of claims, ranging from the notion that constitutions substantively reflect
national values or identity,28 to procedural accounts of popular involvement,29 to
theories of judicial interpretation that emphasize that courts should interpret the
constitution in line with popular values.30 This Part will distinguish and
conceptualize three different ways in which constitutional texts themselves can
demonstrate fidelity to popular values: (1) they can proclaim popular values and
national character in the preamble; (2) they can demand popular involvement in the
drafting or ratification of the constitution; and (3) they can adopt rights and rightsrelated policies that substantively reflect popular opinion. The remainder of this
Part will discuss each of these in turn and explain why this Article focuses
primarily on the third method; that is, how constitutional choices substantively
reflect popular values.

28. See, e.g., JACOBSOHN, supra note 13.
29. See, e.g., Ginsburg et al., supra note 12 (describing popular involvement in
constitution-making).
30. See, e.g., Robert Post, Theories of Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 29
(2009) (describing all of U.S. constitutional interpretation as a “characterization of the
national ethos”); see also Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms,
89 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2014).
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A. Preambles
Perhaps the easiest way for a constitution to express popular values is by
proclaiming such values in the preamble. While the Preamble to the
U.S. Constitution merely makes a relatively brief statement on behalf of “We the
People,”31 a number of constitutions contain elaborate expressions of the people’s
highest values, the triumph of popular rule, the glories of the nation’s leader, and a
range of aspects of the nation’s past.32 Preambles, according to one commentator,
are like “mission statements”: they set out the nation’s goals for the future in light
of the experience of its past.33 Perhaps more than any other part of the constitution,
the preamble offers the perfect opportunity to express what is distinctive about the
nation and its people.34
Examples of preambles that narrate the nation’s past and envision its future are
plentiful. The Preamble to the newly written 2011 Hungarian Constitution, which is
almost two pages long, declares the constitution to be “a covenant among
Hungarians past, present and future” that “expresses the nation’s will and the form
in which we want to live,” references “with pride” “king Saint Stephen” who “built
the Hungarian state . . . one thousand years ago,” recognizes “the role of
Christianity in preserving nationhood,” and commits to “safeguarding our heritage,
our unique language, [and] Hungarian culture,” amongst other things.35
Likewise, the Polish Constitution of 1997 references how Poland “recovered, in
1989, the possibility of a sovereign and democratic of its fate” and expresses
gratitude “to our ancestors for their labours, their struggle for independence
achieved at great sacrifice” and “for our culture rooted in the Christian heritage of
the Nation and in universal human values.”36 Perhaps more radically, the Preamble
of the 1979 Constitution of Iran proclaims “the cultural, social, political, and
economic institutions of Iranian society . . . which represent the earnest aspiration

31. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
32. See infra Figure 1.
33. Jeff King, Constitutions as Mission Statements, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 73, 81 (suggesting that constitutions are
like “mission statements” that articulate the “core, constitutive political commitments of the
community” and “express the political ideas that animate the constitution and polity more
broadly, including . . . the values it seeks to respect in its state planning”).
34. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 13, at 18 (“Preambles are a particular location of
these kinds of national specificities.”); Kevin L. Cope, South Sudan’s Dualistic Constitution,
in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 295, 314
(noting that the preamble is the part where the new South Sudanese Constitution expresses
constitutional identity); Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the
Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 3, 10 (identifying preambles as a forum
to express national values); Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in Comparative
Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 67, 79 (Sujit Choudhry
ed., 2006) (“Preambles to constitutions may be particularly useful for an expressivist.”).
35. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
HUNGARY], pmbl.
36. KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 2, 1997, pmbl.
(Pol.).
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of the Islamic Ummah” and references “the great Islamic Revolution of Iran,” and
“the awakened conscience of the nation, under the leadership of the eminent
marji‘ al-taqlīd, Ayatullāh al-‘Uẓmā Imam Khumaynî, [which] came to perceive
the necessity of pursuing an authentically Islamic and ideological line in its
struggles.”37 In another ideological blend, the 1978 Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China contains a six-page preamble that celebrates the achievements of
the “great leader” Mao Zedong, the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” as
well as socialism in general.38
A growing number of countries use constitutional preambles to make statements
of popular values and national identity. According to my own coding of all of the
world’s written constitutions since 1946, about 25% of all constitutions today contain
preambles that do so.39 Figure 1 depicts both the percentage of constitutions that
contain a preamble, as well as the percentage of constitutions that contain a preamble
that expresses popular values or narrates the nation’s history. Figure 1 shows that
such references to identity and values have grown more common over time. At the
end of the Second World War, only 5% of all constitutions contained preambles that
made statements of national identity, while today that number is 25%. Not all
preambles make such references: some preambles contain more universalist claims,
defining the nation’s relationship to the world community or to particular foreign
states.40 But with growing frequency, constitutional designers are using preambles to
express the highest values of the nation and its people.

Figure 1. Percentage of constitutions with a preamble and percentage of constitutions that
refer to national values or national history.

37. QANUNI ASSASSI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1358 [1980], pmbl.
38. XIANFA pmbl. (1978) (China).
39. The full dataset and coding methodology will be introduced in Part III.
40. See Tom Ginsburg, Nick Foti & Daniel Rockmore, “We the Peoples”: The Global
Origins of Constitutional Preambles 1, 7 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (finding that preambles do not only express national values, but also contain more
internationalist statements).
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Although preambles can articulate national identity, their commitment to
popular values is ultimately merely rhetorical. Preambles are not usually
justiciable—that is, they cannot be enforced in court.41 That does not mean they are
meaningless: statements of national character can serve an important unifying
function for the nation. By appealing to the nation’s past, preambles can help to
overcome divisions of the present and the future.42 Their symbolic significance
notwithstanding, preambles do not usually produce actual bodies of constitutional
law that are justiciable, and that preserve and safeguard popular values from future
law-making activity.
B. Participatory Procedures
Like preambles, participatory procedures (that require popular involvement in
the drafting or promulgation of the constitution) signal intent to respect popular
values; but, like preambles, they also do not necessarily translate into actual
constitutional laws that reflect popular values.
There are different ways in which people can participate in the making of their
constitution. A growing number of constitutions require ratification by popular
referendum. Figure 2 shows that today 34% of all constitutions require ratification
by popular referendum, while in 1950 only 7% did.43 In some countries, citizens
not only ratify the final constitution but also are actively involved in the drafting
stage. One mode of more active involvement in constitution-making is through the
direct election of a constitutional assembly.44 For example, the assembly that wrote
the draft 2011 Icelandic Constitution resulted from a nation-wide election, in which
“[t]ruck drivers, university professors, lawyers, journalists and computer geeks

41. See NATHAN J. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB
BASIC LAWS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT 11 (2002) (noting that
“lengthy sections describing the basic goals, ideology, or the program of the state,” as in
preambles, “may be sincere when issued but are too vaguely worded to bear much legal
weight; they are not designed to limit the government”); Ginsburg, supra note 40, at 4
(surveying preambles in the world’s constitutions and finding that most preambles are not
justiciable). The notable exception is the preamble of the 1958 Constitution of France. See
Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 71-44 DC, July 16, 1971,
J.O. 7114 (Fr.) (declaring the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the preamble of
the 1946 Constitution of France to be part of the 1958 preamble, and declaring the preamble
to be justiciable).
42. For example, the preamble of the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution deliberately invokes
“the historic example of our liberator Simon Bolívar and the heroism and sacrifice of our
aboriginal ancestors,” because constitution-makers recognized that “popular sentiment that
distinguishes [Bolivar] as a symbol of national unity.” See King, supra note 24, at 373 (citing
the Exposicion de Motivos [Explanation of Motives] for the Constitution as published in
Gaceta Oficial 5453, Mar. 24 2000).
43. This data comes from the COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT,
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 207 (introducing and
summarizing the empirical data on the prevalence of constitutions that require ratification by
popular referendum).
44. See id. at 208 (describing modes of participation whereby the citizens provide direct
input into the writing of the constitutional document).
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[were] all among the candidates.”45 In another mode of active involvement, the
citizens of South Africa, Brazil, Uganda, and Eritrea, as well as others, offered
direct input into the drafting of their nations’ new founding documents.46 In South
Africa, the constitutional assembly went to towns and villages to deliberate about
the document, while the Icelandic constitutional assembly used social media, such
as Twitter and Facebook, to seek popular input.47 In general, there has been a
strong trend toward participatory procedures in constitution-making and there
exists a growing consensus that such participation is the wave of the future.48

45. Alda Sigmundsdottir, Iceland Elects Ordinary Folk to Draft Constitution,
BOSTON.COM, Nov. 26, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/ 2010/11
/26/iceland_elects_ordinary_folk_to_draft_constitution/. See generally Jennifer Widner,
Constitution Writing & Conflict Resolution: Data & Summaries, PRINCETON U. (Aug. 2005),
http://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/about/index.html (describing the importance of directly
elected constitutional assemblies).
46. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 208 (describing modes of participation
whereby citizens provide direct input into the writing of the constitutional document); Erik
Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 “People’s Constitution”: Be Careful
What You Wish For, 48 ASIAN SURV. 373 (2008) (describing the process of adopting
Thailand’s “People’s Constitution”); Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making in
Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 57, 61–65 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010) (describing the
widespread popular involvement in the drafting of the 1997 Eritrea constitution); Aili Mari
Tripp, The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF
TRANSITION, supra, at 158, 165–69 (describing the substantial involvement of an elected
“constituent assembly” in the writing of the 1995 Ugandan constitution).
47. See Hassen Ebrahim & Laurel E. Miller, Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South
African: Constitution Making After Apartheid, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION,
supra note 46, at 111, 133–39 (recounting the widespread popular participation in the making
of the 1994 South African Constitution, which was “distinguishing . . . and from comparative
constitutionalist
perspective,
precedent-setting”);
Anne
Meuwese,
Popular
Constitution-Making: The Case of Iceland, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 469, 476–89 (describing the widespread popular involvement
in the writing of the Iceland Constitution, from the involvement of 1000 randomly elected
citizens, to the elected constitutional assembly and the use of Facebook and Twitter to get
popular input).
48. As Richard Solomon, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace, summarizes the new
prevailing wisdom: “[t]here are no one-size-fits-all formulas or models[,]” but
“well-conducted processes can . . . contribute to building stable, peaceful states, whereas
poorly conducted processes most certainly undercut such efforts.” See Richard H. Solomon,
Foreword to FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 46, at xi, xi; see also
Louis Aucoin, Introduction to FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 46,
at xiii, xiii (suggesting that there exists “an emerging international norm that
constitution-making processes should be democratic, transparent, and participatory”);
Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to the
Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note
46, at 3, 8 (suggesting the existence of a “new approach” to constitution making that started
in Africa in the 1990s and “emphasizes participation and puts great premium on dialogue,
debate, consultation, and participation”); Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and the Right to
Take Part in a Public Affair, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION, supra note 46,
at 20, 20 (suggesting that “[t]raditionally, negotiating a constitution was the province of
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Figure 2. Percentage of constitutions that require ratification by popular referendum.

Yet popular involvement does not automatically translate into constitutional
texts that also substantively reflect popular opinion. Referendums, for example, do
not allow for any substantive popular input; they merely present the people with a
yes-or-no decision.49 Referendums are not usually held on a right-by-right basis;
they require a single vote on an entire document or a whole package of
amendments. The result may be an affirmative vote for the constitution even when
a citizen does not agree with all of its individual provisions. Indeed, there are
numerous instances in which authoritarian leaders were able to extend their term
limits through popular referenda that required citizens to vote for a series of
constitutional reforms that offered attractive rights and simultaneously extended
executive power.50 Perhaps most famously, Napoleon Bonaparte used a popular
referendum to proclaim himself the emperor of France.51
Even popular input in the drafting stage does not ensure that the resulting
documents reflect popular opinion. According to one commentator, the highly
inclusive constitution-making process in Iceland became, in part, a “borrowing
exercise[],” whereby the constitutional assembly consulted foreign constitutions
and social science research by Professors Persson and Tabellini.52 Likewise, the

political leaders who held power” while “[d]rafting the constitutional text was expert work”
but that there has been a “significant change” toward more popular participation).
49. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 207–08 (noting that a referendum is “only an
up or down vote over a package of provisions”).
50. Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, Wiki-Constitutionalism, NEW REPUBLIC (May 25, 2010,
12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/75150/wiki-constitutionalism (“Latin
American leaders have discovered that, by packaging ever-longer lists of promises and rights
alongside greater executive functions, they can make a new constitution appealing enough to
the masses that they will vote for it in a referendum.”).
51. PETER EMERSON, DEFINING DEMOCRACY 144 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that, “just to
make it all democratic,” a referendum was introduced in 1804 to approve Napoleon as
emperor).
52. Meuwese, supra note 47, at 485.
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South African Constitution, for all its popular involvement, has been described as a
product of universal norms and values.53 According to Professor Klug, it was “the
emergence of a thin, yet significant, international political culture” that explains
why South Africa adopted a powerful constitutional court even though the judiciary
had served as a tool of repression for the apartheid regime in the past.54 The same
international culture also led the South African constitution-makers to heavily rely
on international treaties when drafting their bill of rights.55
Conversely, constitutions written without any popular input can nonetheless
closely resemble popular opinion. The Japanese Constitution of 1946 offers a
striking example. Although drafted covertly by General McArthur and imposed
unilaterally by the World War II victors, its choices closely corresponded with the
values of the Japanese people.56 For example, historical opinion poll data reveals
that the Japanese people supported limits on the emperor’s power and favored more
rights, even though the local political elites did not.57 Thus, while there likely exists
a correlation between popular participation and a constitution’s reflection of
substantive popular values, these anecdotes show how the two are distinct
concepts. For this reason, the focus of this Article is on substantive constitutional
choices, not on procedure.
C. Bills of Rights
A commitment to respect popular values is likely to be more than a mere
rhetorical or procedural commitment when it is contained in a bill of rights. The
bill of rights represents a set of substantive choices that are typically judicially
enforceable and that can reveal certain views and values that are widely held in a
nation. Even though rights are often considered to be universal as a normative
matter, the empirical record suggests otherwise. Rights are often culturally
contested, not just between the West and the Global South or between Western and
Asian values, for instance, but also between and within liberal democracies.58

53. See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH
AFRICA’S POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 7 (2000).
54. Id.
55. See Richard Cameron Blake, The Frequent Irrelevance of US Judicial Decisions in
South Africa, 15 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 192, 198 (1999) (describing the South African
constitution of 1996 as a “product of other nations’ constitutions . . . and contemporary
human rights conventions” (citation omitted)).
56. David S. Law, The Myth of the 1mposed Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 239, 263 (suggesting, based on historical
opinion poll data, that the Japanese Constitution closely resembles popular values, but not
the values of the ruling elites at the time).
57. Id. at 263 (describing the historical opinion poll data).
58. For an introduction to the cultural relativism debate, compare infra Part VI.B, with
Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective,
9 HUM. RTS. Q. 309, 322–29 (1987) (describing an “African worldview” and how it shapes
African conceptions of rights that are more communitarian in character), and Bilahari
Kausikan, Asia’s Different Standard, 92 FOREIGN POL’Y 24, 34–40 (1993) (suggesting that
human rights are merely Western rights and articulating a distinct Asian perspective on
rights that emphasizes socioeconomic rights over civil and political freedoms).
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In September 2012, a YouTube video mocking the Prophet Muhammad set off a
wave of protests in the Arab world. In no fewer than twenty countries, protesters
took to the streets, carrying signs that read “Shut Up America” and demanding that
President Obama apologize.59 The protests resemble those from 2006, when a
series of Danish cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed sparked violent protests
around the world.60 At the heart of these episodes is a clash between those who
value free speech first and foremost and those who consider their religious values
to be paramount. President Obama responded to the most recent protests with a
passionate defense of freedom of expression in the U.N. General Assembly,61 but
democratic nations continue to stand divided on the extent and nature of the right to
free expression. Egypt’s then newly elected president, Mohamed Morsi, in the
same U.N. General Assembly meeting, responded directly to President Obama by
saying that Egypt only supports “freedom of expression that is not used to incite
hatred against anyone.”62 Mr. Morsi’s view resembles those of European nations,
which do not extend the freedom of expression to hate speech,63 Holocaust denial,64
or even the selling of Nazi paraphernalia on Yahoo and eBay.65
Like the freedom of expression, religious freedom also divides democratic
nations. Consider, for example, the debate over the wearing of the Islamic burqa. In
Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, there is broad popular and legislative
support for a burqa ban, which prohibits women from wearing a face-covering veil
in public.66 Their main concern is that the burqa violates women’s rights. Burqas,

59. David D. Kirkpatrick, Cultural Clash Fuels Muslims Raging at Film, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2012, at A1 (describing the widespread protests as a clash of values between the
freedom of expression in the “individualistic West” and religious values in the Arab world).
60. Mutual Incomprehension, Mutual Outrage, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2006, at 26
(describing the violent protests that followed publication of these cartoons in a Danish
newspaper).
61. See Editorial, President Obama at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2012, at A26
(noting that President Obama contended that “the strongest weapon against hateful speech is
not repression; it is more speech”).
62. Neil MacFarquhar, At U.N., Egypt and Yemen Urge Curbs on Free Speech, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2012, at A10.
63. See VENICE COMMISSION, BLASPHEMY, INSULT AND HATRED: FINDING ANSWERS IN A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 11 (2010) (describing how the freedom of expression under the
European Convention on Human Rights does not extend to hate speech).
64. See Ronald Sokol, Op-Ed., Is It a Crime or an Idiocy?; Holocaust Denial, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 20, 2007, at 5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/ opinion
/19iht-edsokol.4264282.html (describing how Holocaust denial is a criminal offense in most
European countries, and noting how the United States takes a different position).
65. Sean Dodson, The Very Long Arm of the Law, GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2001, 1:15 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2001/nov/09/internetnews (describing how Yahoo
was prohibited from selling Nazi paraphernalia in France and how eBay followed Yahoo’s
lead in removing items from its website). See generally Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional
First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 31 (Michael
Ignatieff ed., 2005) (describing the United States as an outlier in its protection of free
speech, and noting that “much of the rest of the developed democratic world” has after
careful consideration “deliberately chosen a different course”).
66. See The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2011, 5:20 PM),
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in French Prime Minister Sarkozy’s view, “imprison[] women” and are an affront
to “national values of dignity and equality.”67 But British and American lawmakers
and officials largely disagree. Former U.K. immigration minister Damian Green
dismissed the ban as “rather un-British.”68 And U.S. State Department officials
issued an outright condemnation of the French measure, calling it an undue
restriction of religious freedom.69 Interestingly, opinion polls found that 70% of
U.S. citizens oppose the ban, compared to a mere 17% in France.70
It would seem that such differences in national values could affect the specific
menu of rights in a country’s constitution. For example, the 1937 Irish
Constitution, a deeply religious document enacted “in the Name of the Most Holy
Trinity,”71 explicitly recognizes “the right to life of the unborn.”72 Most other
European nations, however, reject the prohibition of abortion and express support
for organizations like Women on Waves, which, in an attempt to secure the rights
of Irish women, offers abortion services just outside Irish borders.73 These nations’
constitutions protect life, but they do not extend protections to the unborn. Most of
the Latin American countries side with the Irish, however, and also extend
constitutional protection to fetuses.74 In these countries, seemingly widely held
popular values are reflected in the constitution.
The constitutional status of socioeconomic rights provides another example of
divergent views on the place of human rights values in constitutions. Most
constitutions today not only contain traditional liberty rights but also include a set
of positive social welfare rights, ranging from a right of access to education to a

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13038095 (reporting that legislation has been
passed in France and Belgium that prohibits women from wearing a full-face Islamic veil);
Bruno Waterfield, Netherlands to Ban the Burka, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 15, 2011, 5:40 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/8765673/Netherlands-to
-ban-the-burka.html (describing similar legislation in the Netherlands).
67. Mark McGivern, Two Women Arrested in Paris for Defying Ban on Islamic Veils,
DAILY REC. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/two-women
-arrested-in-paris-for-defying-1100115.
68. David Mitchell, Op-Ed., If Britain Decides to Ban the Burqa Then I Might Just Start
Wearing One, OBSERVER, July 25, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/ jul
/25/david-mitchell-burqa-ban-tattoos.
69. See US Reiterates Disappointment over French Burqa Ban, FRANCE 24, July 15, 2010,
http://www.france24.com/en/20100715-usa-tells-france-not-ban-burqa-senate-bill-washington.
70. French Senate Approves Burqa Ban, CNN (Sept. 15, 2010, 5:17 AM),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-09-14/world/france.burqa.ban_1_burqa-overt-religious-symbols
-ban-last-year?_s=PM:WORLD (citing opinion poll data).
71. IR. CONST., 1937, pmbl.
72. Id. art. 40(3) (“The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.”).
73. See Who Are We, WOMEN ON WAVES, http://www.womenonwaves.org/en/page/650/
who-are-we.
74. According to my own coding of all written constitutions, fourteen constitutions
protect the right to life for the unborn, six of which are located in Latin America. The Latin
American countries that contain a right to life for the unborn in their constitutions are
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Chile.
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right to food.75 In Portugal, for example, an elaborate catalogue of socioeconomic
rights was enshrined after the fall of the right-wing dictatorial regime and in
response to widespread popular demands for such rights.76 Yet some other
countries are remarkably resilient to this trend. The U.S. Constitution not only
omits social welfare rights altogether, but is devoid of positive entitlements
generally.77 In the absence of state action, there exist no constitutional
entitlements.78 It has been noted that this approach reflects a long-standing
constitutional tradition that “began with Locke and . . . stayed with Locke” and is
an intrinsic part of the cultural heritage of the United States.79 Other nations, too,
have constitutions of a distinctly libertarian character.80 It is these types of
substantive constitutional choices that distinguish nations from each other and that
this Article seeks to explore.81
II. MEASURING CONSTITUTIONAL POPULISM
Empirical analysis of the relationship between popular values and constitutional
choices demands data on both the content of the world’s constitutions and popular
opinion related to that content. To capture the rights-related content of the world’s
constitutions, I draw on data that I collected based on the hand-coding of every
national constitution written since 1946.82 Specifically, this original data set spans a

75. According to my coding of all written constitutions, 83% of all constitutions today
enshrine socioeconomic rights in some form. See infra Part II (introducing the constitutions
data).
76. See Pedro C. Magalhães, Explaining the Constitutionalization of Social Rights:
Portuguese Hypotheses and a Cross-National Test, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 432, 443–49 (describing the origins of
Portugal’s elaborate socioeconomic rights provisions and attributing them to “the Portuguese
legal tradition” and deeply held “values of social Catholicism”).
77. See Frank I. Michelman, The Protective Function of the State in the United States and
Europe: The Constitutional Question, in EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 131, 134
(Georg Nolte ed., 2005) (contrasting the state action doctrine in the United States with notions
of protective duties in Europe).
78. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (setting
forth the state action doctrine in U.S. constitutional law).
79. LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 6 (2d ed. 1991).
80. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1221–26 (2011) (finding that some constitutions are
distinctly libertarian in character, while others are more statist in nature).
81. See John Boli, Human Rights or State Expansion? Cross-National Definitions of
Constitutional Rights, 1870–1970, in INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: CONSTITUTING STATE,
SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 133, 138 (George M. Thomas et al. eds., 1987) (arguing that, for
constitutions, “there is considerable uniformity in their structure” but that “[t]here is much less
uniformity in their content”).
82. This data was first introduced in Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The
Transnational Origins of Constitutions: An Empirical Analysis, Sixth Annual Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies (Nov. 4, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1865724, and subsequently analyzed in Law & Versteeg,
supra note 80, at 1187–89. The 2006–2012 portion of the data was collected and introduced by
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013).
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total of 751 constitutions adopted by 186 different countries from 1946 to 2012.
For each constitution, the text of the entire document was analyzed, and
information on 237 variables regarding both substantive rights and rightsenforcement mechanisms was collected. This process is documented in greater
detail in my earlier work.83
From the larger dataset, I selected twelve rights-related constitutional
provisions. These provisions represent specific choices of the kind that different
nations may make differently, depending on their values. The twelve substantive
constitutional choices included in the analysis are (1) the protection of family life;
(2) the right to rest/leisure; (3) the right to work; (4) the protection of the
environment; (5) the protection of marriage; (6) the right to petition; (7) the right to
assembly; (8) the right to strike; (9) the protection of equality regardless of sexual
orientation; (10) a prohibition of abortion (through protection of the unborn);
(11) gender equality in labor relations; and (12) the protection of motherhood.
These rights represent a mixture of first-generation negative liberty rights (petition,
assembly, and gender equality), second-generation socioeconomic rights (rest,
leisure, work, and strike), as well as some more recent rights relating to the family
and traditional values (marriage, abortion, the family, and homosexuality).84 All of
these rights are commonly found in the world’s constitutions. While the
first-generation rights are almost universally embraced in constitutions globally, the
other two categories are more contested. It is possible, therefore, that cross-country
differences in values are more strongly reflected in the latter two, and especially the
third, categories of rights. The sampling of these rights provisions was further
guided and constrained by the necessity of choosing constitutional provisions for
which corresponding popular opinion data could be found. The resulting list of
twelve constitutional provisions can be found in the left-hand column of Table 1.
I contrast these twelve specific constitutional choices with data from the World
Values Survey (WVS).85 The World Values Survey represents opinion data from
different countries, collected by a worldwide network of social scientists.86 As of
today, the World Values Survey has conducted standardized surveys in ninety
countries, covering about 88% of the world’s population.87 The surveys have been
conducted in six waves, between 1981 and 2010, surveying a total of nearly half a
million households.88 Most countries are surveyed in more than one wave, thereby

83. See Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 82, at pt. VI; Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at
1187–90 & nn.103–16.
84. Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 1225, 1231 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007)
(distinguishing first-generation “classical rights to civil and political participation, and to
equality,” from “second generation” social and economic rights for individuals).
85. For documentation and online analysis of the World Values Survey data, see
WORLD VALUES SURVEY (2012), http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
86. See Ronald Inglehart, Foreword to VALUES CHANGE THE WORLD (2008) (describing
the infrastructure of the World Values Survey).
87. Id.
88. I integrated the World Values Survey data with data from the European Values
Study that conducted the exact same survey in an additional set of European countries. For a
full overview of all countries, see INTEGRATED EVS/WVS 1981–2008 DATAFILE,
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allowing for a comparison over time. The World Values Survey is designed to
capture what people’s beliefs and values are. In each wave, a representative sample
of each country’s public is interviewed, using a standardized questionnaire that is
intended to capture “values concerning religion, gender roles, work motivations,
democracy, good governance, social capital, political participation, tolerance of
other groups, environmental protection and subjective wellbeing.”89
From the World Values Survey, I selected twelve items from the standardized
questionnaire that correspond to the twelve constitutional provisions listed in the
left-hand column of Table 1. These twelve questionnaire items are listed in the
right-hand column of Table 1. On most items, and with some variations,
respondents are asked to rate a certain aspect or dimension of life (such as “work”
or “leisure time”) as “very important,” “rather important,” “not very important,” or
“not at all important.”
Where possible, I selected the more specific questions. For example, instead of
assessing whether people find their family “important” or “very important,” I
picked a more specific question that enquires about family values (and specifically
whether the respondent believes that a child, in order to grow up happily, needs a
home with both a father and a mother). Likewise, instead of assessing whether
people value their natural environment, I selected a question that asks whether
people would be willing to spend money to protect the environment. And instead of
simply asking whether people value gender equality in the abstract, I selected an
item that asks people whether, in time of job scarcity, they believe that men are
more entitled to jobs than women.90 The choice to use these more specific
questions was guided by a desire to gauge how deeply certain values are held in a
nation.
For the purpose of my analysis, I calculated the proportion of respondents in
each country that gave each of these answers, and I grouped together those who
value each right and those who do not. The underlined responses in the right-hand
column of Table 1 indicate which respondents were grouped together. The
highlighted constitutional provisions in the left-hand side of Table 1 indicate which
provisions they will be linked to in the empirical analysis.91

http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSIntegratedEVSWVS.jsp?Idioma=I. Combined, these
two surveys cover ninety countries, conducted in six waves, in the periods from 1981–1984,
1989–1993, 1994–1999, 1999–2004, 2005–2006, and 2008–2010.
89. Inglehart, supra note 86, at 1.
90. The results do not depend on this selection. Specifically, if I replace some of the
more specific questions with more general ones, the results presented in subsequent Parts of
this Article remain the same.
91. I also experimented with alternative classifications of the respondents, but I did not
find that this affected the findings presented in subsequent Parts.
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Table 1. Constitutional provisions and corresponding questions in World Values
Survey (WVS)

1. Family
(found in 66% of all
constitutions in 2010)

2. Rest/Leisure
(found in 42% of all
constitutions in 2010)

3. Work
(found in 81% of all
constitutions in 2010)

Constitutional provision

Popular opinion (WVS)

Does the constitution provide
protection for rights for the
family?

Traditional family values. Do
you think that a child needs a
home with both a father and a
mother to grow up happily?

1 Yes
2 No

0 Tend to disagree
1 Tend to agree

Does the constitution contain
a right to rest and leisure or a
goal for the government to
protect and/or (gradually)
provide rest and leisure?

How important is leisure time
in your life?

1 Yes
2 No

1 Very important
2 Rather important
3 Not very important
4 Not at all important

Does the constitution contain
a right to work or a goal for
the government to protect
and/or (gradually) provide
work?

How important is work in
your life?

1 Yes
2 No
4. Environment
(found in 65% of all
constitutions in 2010)

1 Very important
2 Rather important
3 Not very important
4 Not at all important

Does the constitution contain
a right to a clean or healthy
environment for citizens, or a
goal for the government to
protect and/or (gradually)
provide this right?

I would agree to an increase in
taxes if the extra money were
used to prevent environmental
pollution.

1 Yes
2 No

1 Strongly agree
2 Agree
3 Disagree
4 Strongly disagree
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Table 1 (continued)

5. Marriage
(found in 36% of all
constitutions in 2010)

6. Petition
(found in 50% of all
constitutions in 2010)

7. Assembly

Constitutional provision

Popular opinion (WVS)

Does the constitution provide
a right to get married, or a
special
protection
of
marriage?

Do you agree or disagree with
the following statement?
“Marriage is an outdated
institution.”

1 Yes
2 No

0 Disagree
1 Agree
2 Other answer

Does the constitution contain
a right to petition, or a right to
file complaints against, or
requests
with,
the
government?

Did you ever sign a petition,
do you think you might do so
in the future, or would you
never under any circumstance
sign a petition?

1 Yes
2 No

1 Have done
2 Might do
3 Would never do

Does the constitution provide
for a right to assembly?

Did

1 Yes
2 No

1 Have done
2 Might do
3 Would never do

Does the constitution contain
a right to strike?

Did you ever attend an official
strike, do you think you might
do so in the future, or would
you never under any
circumstance
attend
an
official strike?

1 Yes
2 No

1 Have done
2 Might do
3 Would never do

(found in 93% of all
constitutions in 2010)

8. Strike
(found in 45% of all
constitutions in 2010)

you ever attend a
lawful/peaceful
demonstration, do you think
you might do so in the future,
or would you never under any
circumstance attend a lawful
demonstration?
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Table 1 (continued)

9. Homosexuality
(found in 4% of all
constitutions in 2010)

10. Abortion
(found in 8% of all
constitutions in 2010)

11. Gender equality in
labor
(found in 20% of all
constitutions in 2010)

Constitutional provision

Popular opinion (WVS)

Does the constitution protect
equality regardless of sexual
orientation?

Please tell me whether you
think homosexuality can
always be justified, never be
justified, or something in
between, using this scoring:

1Yes
2 No

1 Never justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Always justifiable

Does
the
constitution
(implicitly) prohibit abortion,
by protecting life of “the
unborn,” by stating that the
right to life should be
protected from the moment
of conception onwards,
or explicitly prohibiting
abortion?

Please tell me for whether you
think abortion can always be
justified, never be justified, or
something in between, using
this scoring?

1 Yes
2 No

1 Never justifiable
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Always justifiable

Does the constitution contain
equality for women in labor
relations, e.g., women should
receive equal pay for equal
work?

Do you think that, when jobs
are scarce, men should have
more right to a job than
women?

1 Yes
2 No

1 Agree
2 Disagree
3 Neither
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Table 1 (continued)

12. Motherhood
(found in 43% of all
constitutions in 2010)

Constitutional provision

Popular opinion (WVS)

Does the constitution provide
special
protection
for
mothers?

Do you think that a woman
has to have children in order
to be fulfilled or is this not
necessary?

1 Yes
2 No

0 Not necessary
1 Needs children

Some of the questions listed in Table 1 explicitly inquire about people’s values.
They ask people about their position on homosexuality, abortion, marriage, and
how much they value work or leisure time, for example. The more specific
questions on whether women need children to be fulfilled, whether children need
both a father and a mother, whether men have more right to a job than women, or
whether people are willing to pay for increased environmental protection are also
all questions about values. By contrast, the questions on whether people would be
willing to strike, assemble, or petition less obviously capture values, but rather
appear to capture cultural attitudes on whether people are willing to exercise these
rights. Both popular values and cultural attitudes, however, potentially reveal
important cross-country differences in national character that might be reflected in
a country’s bill of rights. Both are therefore included in the analysis.
In the empirical analysis that follows, the survey responses from the right
column of Table 1 are in various ways linked to the corresponding rights from the
left column of Table 1. To establish whether rights are connected to or
disconnected from popular values, the analysis assesses (1) whether the rights that
are included in the constitution indeed represent popular values and (2) whether the
rights that are not included represent unpopular values. It is possible, however, that
the inclusion and omission of rights are not valued in the same way by the people
governed by a constitution. At least in theory, it is possible that someone deeply
values the environment but does not want to enshrine a right to a healthy
environment in the constitution. The questions from the World Values Survey do
not capture this difference, as none of these questions explicitly enquire whether
people would want to enshrine their values in their constitution. The possibility that
the omission of important popular values from the constitution might nonetheless
enjoy popular support will be explored in Part V, which presents the results from
over a thousand survey responses that ask people whether they want their values
enshrined in the constitution. The results from the survey suggest that people do
generally want to enshrine their values in the constitution.
III. EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND POPULAR VALUES
Contrasting data on constitutional rights protection with data from the World
Values Survey reveals that there exists only a weak relationship between
constitutional choices and popular values. This statement finds support both in
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simple descriptive explorations of how certain rights connect to popular values92
and in multivariate regression analysis.93
A. Cross-Country Descriptive Exploration
A first glance at the data immediately reveals that constitutional choices are
often divorced from popular views and values.94 For some constitutional rights, the
connection appears illusive: countries whose people deeply value a right fail to
adopt it, whereas countries whose people do not value the same right do adopt it.
For other rights, the values they represent are almost universally endorsed across
countries, but only some countries actually enshrine these rights in their
constitutions.
To illustrate a scenario where there is no apparent link between constitutional
choices and popular values, consider the right to strike. In 2010, about 45% of the
world’s constitutions included a right to strike. However, the inclusion of the right
to strike often does not match the importance that people in these countries attach
to this right. The constitutions of Morocco, Hungary, Romania, El Salvador,
Belarus, Slovak Republic, Venezuela, Kyrgyz Republic, and the Philippines each
contain a right to strike, although over 90% of the their populations (ranging from
96% in Morocco to 91% in the Philippines) claimed that they would never, under
any circumstance, participate in a legal strike. At the opposite extreme is the United
Kingdom, where almost 100% of people surveyed are willing to engage in a legal
strike, even though this right lacks constitutional status in British law.95 Other
constitutions also omit the right, even though it is highly valued by the people. In
South Korea, Sweden, and Denmark, over half of the population is willing to
participate in a legal strike, but the right is omitted from the constitutional
document. The left two columns in Table 2 list the five countries whose people’s
values are most and least in line with the nation’s decision to include the right to
strike in the constitution, while the right two columns list the five countries whose
people’s values are most and least in line with the decision to omit the right from
the nation’s founding document.

92. See Part III.A
93. See Part III.B
94. The World Values Survey data presented in this Part is based on the latest value for
each country. For fifty-seven (out of ninety) countries, this data was collected in the last
wave of data collection that took place between 2008 and 2010, while for the other countries
it is based on the last available wave before 2008.
95. See supra note 6.
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Table 2. The right to strike and popular values in 2010
Right to strike included in constitution

Right to strike not included in constitution

Highest agreement
(% that would go on
a legal strike)

Lowest agreement
(% that would go
on a legal strike)

Highest agreement
(% that would
never go on a legal
strike)

Macedonia
Croatia
Peru
France

55%
50%
45%
45%

Morocco
Hungary
Romania
El Salvador

4%
6%
7%
8%

Pakistan
Egypt
Cyprus
Jordan

98%
97%
97%
96%

Azerbaijan

41%

Belarus

8%

Indonesia

92%

Lowest agreement
(% that would never
go on a legal strike)
United
Kingdom
Korea
Sweden
Denmark
Bosnia &
Herzegovina

0%
36%
48%
49%
56%

As another example, consider the protection of the natural environment, which,
in some form, is enshrined in about two-thirds of all constitutions in force today. In
some countries, the natural environment receives constitutional protection even
though the largest part of the population is not willing to pay for increased
environmental protection. To illustrate, in Lithuania, Germany, Egypt, Estonia,
Hungary, and others, more than two-thirds of the population oppose a tax increase
to protect the environment, even though a healthy environment is enshrined in the
constitution as one of the nation’s highest values. Conversely, the constitutions of
the Dominican Republic, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina omit
the right, even though over two-thirds of the population values the environment so
much that they would be willing to increase their taxes to protect it. Table 3
summarizes the highest and lowest discrepancy between popular values and the
right to a healthy environment among nations that include and exclude the right,
respectively.
Table 3. The right to a healthy environment and popular values in 2010
Environmental protection
included in constitution

Environmental protection
not included in constitution

Highest Agreement
(% willing to
increase tax to protect
environment)

Lowest Agreement
(% willing to
increase tax to
protect environment)

Highest Agreement
(% not willing to
increase tax to
protect environment)

Vietnam
El Salvador
Turkey

91%
84%
78%

Lithuania
Germany
Egypt

23%
26%
31%

Austria
Morocco
Ireland

63%
61%
60%

Mali
Iran

77%
77%

Estonia
Hungary

33%
33%

Jordan
Singapore

55%
55%

Lowest Agreement
(% not willing to
increase tax to protect
environment)
Dominican
Republic
Bangladesh
Tanzania
Bosnia &
Herzegovina
Denmark

14%
24%
25%
30%
34%

For a few constitutional provisions, the values they represent are almost
universally endorsed across all countries. When such near-universally endorsed
values make it into the constitution, the constitution aligns with popular opinion.
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Yet in many cases, the constitution omits the relevant protections, thereby creating
a dissonance between the written document and popular opinion. To illustrate,
consider the right to get married. In 2010, about one-third of all constitutions
protected marriage. In all these cases, more than two-thirds of the population
disagreed with the statement that “marriage is an outdated institution,” revealing
overwhelming popular support for the institution of marriage. Yet the same
overwhelming support for marriage is also present in countries where the
constitution omits protection. In the United States, for example, 88% of the
population disagrees that marriage is outdated, yet marriage does not appear in the
constitution. In fact, in every single country where the protection of marriage was
omitted from the constitution, over half of the population continues to value this
institution.
Table 4. The right to get married and popular values in 2010
Right to get married
included in constitution

Right to get married
not included in constitution

Highest Agreement
(% that believes that
marriage is not
outdated)

Lowest Agreement
(% that believes that
marriage is not
outdated)

Indonesia
Vietnam

96%
92%

Spain
Germany

68%
71%

Ethiopia
Dominican
Republic
Slovakia

90%

Switzerland
United
Kingdom
Bulgaria

89%
88%

Highest Agreement
(% that believes
that marriage is not
outdated)

Lowest Agreement
(% that believes that
marriage is outdated)

38%
35%

Pakistan
Georgia

1%
4%

72%

Luxembourg
France
Kyrgyz
Republic

32%

Egypt

4%

73%
73%

Belgium
Austria

31%
31%

Turkey
Bangladesh

5%
5%

The opposite scenario occurs for the right to equality regardless of sexual
orientation. With only a few exceptions (notably, Sweden, the Netherlands,
Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Spain, Finland, Australia,
and Germany), the majority of citizens in each country claims that homosexuality
is unacceptable. Such disapproval is generally reflected in written constitutions,
which only rarely protect homosexuality. In South Africa, which is one of the few
countries to constitutionally protect homosexuality, the approval rate is very low:
according to the World Values Survey, 82% of all South Africans deem
homosexuality unacceptable today, while 88% deemed it unacceptable at the time
the constitution was written.96 Conversely, the constitutions of the countries most
accepting of homosexuality (the Netherlands and Sweden) do not actually include
the right (although the Dutch parliament has recently been debating its inclusion).97

96. World Values Survey Ass’n, supra note 1.
97. Kamer Voor Seksuele Geaardheid in Artikel 1 Growndwet [Dutch Parliament
Supports Inclusion of Equality Regardless of Sexual Orientation in Article 1 Constitution],
TROUW, (Mar. 8, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4492/Nederland/article/
detail/3295998/2012/08/03/Kamer-voor-seksuele-geaardheid-in-artikel-1-grondwet.dhtml.
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In most cases, constitutional omission of a protection for homosexuality is actually
reflective of popular views and values.
B. Regression Analysis
To explore more systematically the seemingly weak relationship between
popular values and constitutional choices, this Part turns to regression analysis.
Regression analysis enables an exploration of whether, in comparative perspective,
countries that attach a strong importance to certain values are more likely to
enshrine those in their constitution than countries that attach lower importance to
the same values. Of course, causal questions on the determinants of constitutional
rights adoption in comparative perspectives are notoriously complex and difficult
to resolve using common cross-country statistical techniques.98 To know that
popular opinion affects the adoption of particular rights does not necessarily tell us
whether popular opinion actually influences adoption or is merely correlated with
it. For example, it is possible that popular opinion does not only affect
constitution-making, but that the constitution also affects popular opinion in turn.99
My research design does not account for the possibility of reversed causality, and
all results should be interpreted with some caution. Nevertheless, even correlations
can shed light upon the plausibility of certain hypotheses and inform subsequent
interpretations as to why countries adopt certain rights.100 Conversely, the absence
of any correlation between popular opinion and constitutional rights suggests that it
is unlikely that they are related.
To explore how popular values relate to constitutional choices, I estimate twelve
regressions; one for each of the twelve values and corresponding rights described in
the previous section. Specifically, I test (1) whether countries in which people
adhere to traditional family values are more likely to protect the nuclear family in
their constitution; (2) whether countries in which people consider leisure time
important are more likely to adopt a right to leisure in their constitution;
(3) whether countries in which people consider work to be very important are more
likely to adopt a right to work in their constitution; (4) whether countries in which
people value the environment even at the expense of their own income are more
likely to protect the environment in their constitution; (5) whether countries in
which people disagree that marriage is an outdated institution are more likely to
enshrine a right to get married in their constitution; (6) whether countries in which
people are willing to sign a petition are more likely to adopt the right to petition in
their constitution; (7) whether countries in which people are more willing to
lawfully assemble are more willing to enshrine a right to assembly in their

98. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 919; Anne Meuwese & Mila Versteeg,
Quantitative Methods for Comparative Constitutional Law, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN
COMPARATIVE LAW 230, 233 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (discussing the
difficulty of distinguishing correlation from causation).
99. See Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 3 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008) (suggesting
that, in theory, constitutional law may change popular opinion, but finding little empirical
support for such a hypothesis in the United States).
100. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 919.
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constitution; (8) whether countries in which people are more willing to participate
in a legal strike are more likely to enshrine a right to strike in their constitution;
(9) whether countries in which people think homosexuality is justifiable are more
likely to protect equality regardless of sexual orientation; (10) whether countries in
which people agree that abortion is never justifiable are more likely to protect the
right to life from the moment of conception; (11) whether countries in which
people disagree that men are more entitled to jobs than women in times of job
scarcity are more likely to enshrine gender equality in labor relations in their
constitution; and (12) whether countries in which people believe that women need
children to be fulfilled are more likely to protect motherhood.
These relationships are explored in twelve separate probit regressions in which
the presence of the relevant provision in the world’s constitutions is the dependent
variable,101 and which each include the same control variables: (1) the country’s
level of democracy, as measured numerically in the political science literature;102
(2) the natural log of a country’s level of GDP per capita;103 (3) the
comprehensiveness of the constitutional text, as measured by its total number of
articles;104 (4) whether a country possesses a common law jurisdiction;105 (5) a set

101. Because constitutions tend to change infrequently, and the surveys that capture
popular values are conducted only every few years, each model predicts constitutional rights
adoption not from year to year, but from wave to wave of survey data collection, using the
last year of each of the six waves of data collection that took place. Specifically, each of the
twelve regression models combine the cross-sections for the years 1984, 1993, 1999, 2004,
2006, and 2010, and calculate robust standard errors clustered at the country level, so that
observations are allowed to be correlated over time. See The Integrated EVS/WVS 1981–
2008 Datafile, WORLD VALUES ASS’N, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSIntegrated
EVSWVS.jsp?Idioma=I (describing when each of the waves of data collection took place).
As a robustness check, I also repeated the same model when observing each country at fiveyear intervals in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2010. When doing so, the results
are almost the same as those reported below.
To further explore whether my findings depend on model specification, I repeated
all the specifications reported in Table 6 when adding (1) a lagged version of the dependent
variable as a predictor variable, and again repeated them when adding (2) a series of binary
variables that control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, also known as “fixed
effects,” while estimating a linear probability model instead of a probit model. For both
these models, the results are largely similar to those reported in Table 6. Moreover, I
estimated a set of cross-sectional regressions for the years 1990, 2000, and 2010. When
doing so, results were again largely similar to those reported in Table 6.
102. My measure of a country’s level of democracy is the “polity2” variable from the
Polity IV data set, which is widely used by political scientists. This variable ranges from +10
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). See Monty G. Marshall & Keith Jaggers,
Polity IV Project: Dataset User’s Manual (Oct. 24, 2007), http://home.bi.no/a0110709/
PolityIV_manual.pdf.
103. My measure of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita comes from WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2011 (2011).
104. The measure of the total number of articles in the constitution is based on my own
coding of all written constitutions. See supra Part III (describing the constitutions data).
105. I adopted the definition of “common law” countries used by Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Quality of Government,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 222 (1999).
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of binary variables for each period in which people were polled about their opinion,
also known as time fixed-effects; and, finally, (6) three regional variables,
capturing whether a country is located in Africa, Western Europe and North
America, or in Asia, respectively.106
Each of these variables has been theorized as important predictors of
constitutional design choices in the existing literature. Existing research suggests
that democracy is correlated with the adoption of negative liberty and judicial
process rights.107 Economic wealth, by contrast, might plausibly predict whether
countries adopt expensive socioeconomic rights, such as the right to work or the
right to leisure. Intuitively, wealthier countries would seem more likely to adopt
socioeconomic rights because they possess the resources to uphold them in
practice. Yet the opposite scenario is also possible: poorer countries may adopt
such rights as aspirations for the future.108 The specificity of the constitutional text
may determine whether constitutional designers grant certain values constitutional
status in the first place. Specifically, it turns out that there exist important
differences in how ambitious any given constitution is: some merely enshrine a
bare minimum of rights, while others set out elaborate policies.109 The common law
system may also affect whether certain rights are adopted in the first place.
Specifically, the common law system has traditionally been associated with a
tradition of a small state, which may increase the propensity of common law
systems to adopt negative liberty rights and to omit positive socioeconomic
rights.110 Finally, the probability of adopting rights is likely to increase with time,
as there has been a global trend toward “rights creep”; that is, a growing number of
countries adopting a growing number of rights.111

106. The region of Latin America and the Caribbean is omitted because it serves as the
reference category for interpretation.
107. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1226 (documenting a positive correlation
between democracy and a libertarian constitutional ideology).
108. See David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Measuring Government Effort to
Respect Economic and Social Human Rights: A Peer Benchmark, in ECONOMIC RIGHTS:
CONCEPTUAL, MEASUREMENT, AND POLICY ISSUES 214, 215 (Shareen Hertel & Lanse
Minkler eds., 2007) (observing that it is difficult for countries to improve their performance
in the areas of economic and social rights in a measurable way without “getting richer”).
109. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1213–21 (describing constitutional
comprehensiveness as one of the main dimensions along which constitutions vary).
110. See 1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF
THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 94 (1978) (noting that
negative liberties “have flourished chiefly among people where, at least for long periods,
judge-made law predominated”); Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth:
Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 506 (2001) (finding empirical evidence of a
positive relationship between use of a common law system and economic growth, and
attributing this relationship at least partly to the “greater judicial protection of property and
contract rights from executive interference” that characterizes common law systems); La
Porta et al., supra note 105 (finding that common law countries exhibit greater respect for
political rights than countries of other legal origins).
111. Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1194 (documenting the phenomenon of “rights
creep”).
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Table 5 presents the regression outputs. The overarching impression from the
regressions is that there exists generally no connection between popular values and
constitutional choices. In most cases, the marginal effects for popular values are
close to zero, while in other cases, they are even negative. In all but one case, they
are statistically insignificant. The sole exception is the values on abortion, which
are positively correlated with the constitutional protection of the unborn, albeit only
statistically significant at the 10% confidence level.
The lack of connection between popular values and the constitution raises the
question of what factors—if not values—explain cross-country differences in
constitutional choices. As it turns out, some of the control variables are statistically
significantly correlated with constitutional choices, although their impact depends
on the constitutional right at issue. As expected, a common law tradition is
negatively correlated with socioeconomic and group rights; countries within this
tradition are less likely to protect the family, rest, work, a healthy environment,
strike, gender equality in labor relationships, and motherhood.112 It is also no
surprise that the comprehensiveness of a constitution is correlated with some rights
that are relatively uncommon in the world’s constitutions, such as the protection of
the environment, the freedom of petition, gender equality in labor relationships, and
a protection of motherhood.113 Thus, in these cases, it is the wide-ranging scope of
the document as a whole that explains the adoption of these rights, not popular
opinion. More counterintuitive is that democracy is positively correlated with the
constitutional adoption of the right to rest, the protection of the environment, the
protection of the unborn, but not with any other rights. Finally, economic wealth is
negatively correlated with constitutional protection of the right to rest and petition,
as well as the protection of the family, environment, and motherhood. This
suggests that these rights are at least partly aspirational, as good working hours, a
healthy environment, and the protection of the family and motherhood often remain
elusive in poorer countries. While none of these findings should be interpreted as
causal relationships, the overall impression from the regressions is that any given
country’s constitutional choices are more a function of its regime type, its legal
system, and the constitution’s overarching drafting style than the specific
preferences and values of its people.

112. Contrary to expectations, the common law tradition is also negatively correlated
with the freedom of petition.
113. This finding is broadly consistent with findings from my earlier work, which singled
out some of these rights as “esoteric rights,” which only appear in ambitious constitutions
that protect a large number of rights. Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1217 tbl.3.

1162

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1133

2014]

UNPOPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

1163

IV. WHICH COUNTRIES HAVE POPULIST CONSTITUTIONS?
In comparative perspective, there appears to be little evidence that nations that
deeply value certain rights are more likely to enshrine these rights in their
constitutions than countries whose people attach less value to these same rights.
The preceding analysis, however, provides little insight into the degree to which
any given constitution reflects popular values. Even when cross-country differences
in values do not explain cross-country differences in constitutional choices, some
constitutions could still enjoy high levels of domestic support. This Part therefore
explores to what degree each constitution aligns with popular values, and singles
out the world’s most populist constitutions.
A. A Ranking of Populist Constitutions
To gauge whether written constitutions are generally reflective of popular values
on the aforementioned twelve dimensions, I created a numerical populist
constitution index that captures to what extent the constitutional choices of any
given country reflect the values of its people. Specifically, the index captures the
percentage of people in a country whose values align with how their constitution
deals (or does not deal) with an issue, and then calculates the average country score
across all twelve issues. When the constitution enshrines a right, the index captures
the percentage of people who value this right, and when the constitution omits the
right, the index captures the percentage of people who do not value this right.114
The resulting index captures constitutional populism; that is, the extent to which
any given constitution aligns with public opinion. To illustrate how the index is
constructed, Table 6 lists its different components for South Africa in 2010. The
South African Constitution, Table 6 suggests, is not very populist: on average
across twelve issues its values align with the opinion of only 36% of the
population.

114. In constructing this index, the cut-offs to separate different groups of respondents
from each other are the same as indicated in Table 1.
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Table 6. Populist Constitution Score for South Africa in 2010

Constitutional right

Included in
constitution?

Corresponding value

Populism
score

Freedom of petition

Yes

Percentage of people who would be willing to
petition their government: 51%

51%

Right to assembly

Yes

Percentage of people who want to participate in
a legal assembly: 50%

50%

Right to work

Yes

Percentage of people that consider work very
important: 93%

93%

Protection of the
environment

Yes

Percentage of people willing to pay for
increased environmental protection: 46%

46%

Right to strike

Yes

Percentage of people willing to go on a legal
strike: 18%

18%

Equality regardless
of sexual
orientation

Yes

Percentage of people who think homosexuality
is acceptable: 18%

18%

Right to get married

No

Percentage of people who disagree that
marriage is an outdated institution: 78%

22%

Protection of
motherhood

No

Percentage of people that believe that women
need to have children in order to be fulfilled:
47%

53%

Right to life for the
unborn (prohibition
of abortion)

No

Percentage of people that consider abortion
unacceptable: 84%

16%

No

Percentage of people who believe that in times
of job scarcity, men have more right to a job
than a woman: 35%

35%

No

Percentage of people with traditional family
values (child needs both father and mother):
90%

10%

No

Percentage of people that consider leisure time
to be very important: 78%

22%

Gender equality in labor
(e.g., equal pay for
equal work)

Protection of family life
Right to rest
Populist Constitution Score

36%

Table 7 lists the same scores for all countries in the years 2000 and 2010. The
first and third columns list the countries in which popular support for the menu of
rights in the constitutional document falls short of a majority; that is, the average
popular agreement across the twelve issues falls short of 51%. In 2010, 44% of all
countries fall in this category, including Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Canada, and the United States. The second and fourth columns of Table 7
list the countries whose constitution does reflect the values of more than half of the
population. In 2010, this was the case for 56% of all countries, including, but not
limited to, the constitutions of China, Russia, and Sweden.
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Constitutional scholars commonly believe that for a constitution to carry strong
democratic legitimacy, it needs to be more democratic than ordinary legislation and
needs support from a supermajority of all people.115 Figure 3 and Table 7 reveal that,
among the world’s constitutions today, only in the constitutions of Macedonia,
Guatemala, Italy, El Salvador, Uganda, Poland, and Ethiopia does the average right
reflect the values of more than two-thirds of the population. Considering the alleged
democratic legitimacy of constitutional texts,116 these numbers seem surprisingly low.
Table 7. Populist Constitution Scores in 2000 and 2010

2000

2010

_________________

_________________

Less than 51%
of population

More than 51%
of population

Less than 51%
of population

More than 51%
of population

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

______________________________________

Country
New
Zealand
South
Africa
Australia
Canada
Denmark

%

Country

%

Country

%

Country

%

34

Argentina

52

32

Argentina

52

35
35
36
37

52
52
53
54

Singapore
Trinidad &
Tobago
Malaysia
Australia
South Africa

33
33
34
36

Finland
Chile
Zambia
Sweden

52
52
53
54

54
54

Canada
New Zealand

37
37

Romania
South Korea

54
54

Iceland
Norway
United
States
Estonia
United
Kingdom

41
41

Columbia
Hungary
Finland
France
Czech
Republic
Ireland

44
44

Egypt
Slovenia

54
54

Morocco
Denmark

37
37

Egypt
Algeria

54
54

44

Latvia

54

Zimbabwe

38

55

Taiwan

45

55

Norway

42

Japan
Bosnia &
Herzegovina
Sweden
Bangladesh
India

45

Uruguay
Dominican
Republic

Georgia
Dominican
Republic

55

Cyprus

42

Mali

55

46
46
48
48

Lithuania
Chile
Georgia
Philippines

55
55
56
57

Iceland
Japan
Estonia
Taiwan

42
43
44
44

Belarus
Germany
Latvia
Mexico

55
56
56
56

55

115. See Karim Fahim & Mayy El Sheikh, First Round of Voting Spurs Dispute in Egypt,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at A13 (quoting one of the members of the Constitutional Assembly
as saying that the new Egyptian Constitution would need a two-thirds majority to be legitimate).
116. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
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Table 7 (continued)
2000

2010

_________________

_________________

Less than 51%
of population

More than 51%
of population

______________________________________

Less than 51%
of population

______________________________________

More than 51%
of population

______________________________________

Country

______________________________________

Country

%

Country

%

%

Country

%

Switzerland
Mexico
Malta
Austria
Belgium
Netherlands

49
50
50
50
50
51

Peru
Spain
Ukraine
Romania
Germany
Moldova

57
58
58
58
60
60

Nigeria
—

51
—

South Korea
Portugal

60
60

Bosnia &
Herzegovina
India
Bangladesh
United States
Tanzania
Jordan
United
Kingdom
Thailand

44
44
45
45
46
46

Saudi Arabia
Ukraine
Moldova
Philippines
Spain
Turkey

56
57
57
57
57
58

46
48

Iraq
Greece
Slovak
Republic
Russian
Federation

58
59

—

—

Brazil

61

Netherlands

49

—
—

—
—

61

Czech Republic

49

—

—

Armenia
Russian
Federation
Turkey

61
62

Austria
France

49
49

—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
—

Belarus
Croatia
Azerbaijan
Iran

62
62
62
62

Rwanda
Malta
Portugal
Belgium

49
50
50
50

—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—

63
63
63
64

Colombia
Ireland
Hungary
Uruguay

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Luxembourg
Venezuela
Bulgaria
Macedonia
Slovak
Republic
Italy
Poland
Greece
El Salvador
Pakistan
Albania
China
—
—
—
—
—
—

64
66
67
68
68
69
70
73
—
—
—
—
—
—

Slovenia
Lithuania
Nigeria
Switzerland
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

59
59

50
50
51
51

Croatia
Bulgaria
Kyrgyz
Republic
Albania
Peru
Luxembourg
Burkina
Faso
Pakistan
Indonesia
China

59
60

62
62
62
62

51
51
51
51
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Armenia
Venezuela
Ghana
Brazil
Vietnam
Azerbaijan
Iran
Macedonia
Guatemala
Italy
El Salvador
Uganda
Poland
Ethiopia

63
63
63
65
66
66
66
67
67
67
68
69
69
76

61
61
62
62

Note: The italicization denotes countries whose constitutional approval rating is higher than 66%.
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B. Predictors of Constitutional Populism
In 2010, the average Singaporean constitutional right accorded with the values
of a mere 32% of Singaporeans, while the Ethiopian constitution’s rights provisions
reflected, on average, the values of no fewer than 76% of Ethiopians. Why do some
constitutions demonstrate fidelity to popular values while others do not? This
sub-Part will provide an initial exploration of this question.
Possible explanations for such cross-country variation may relate to (1) features
of the constitution and (2) features of the nation. There are a number of
constitutional features that are likely to relate to constitutional populism. First, the
age of the constitution may affect the degree to which a constitution is connected to
popular values. Specifically, older constitutions might be disconnected from
popular values because they have failed to keep pace with evolving popular
opinions over time. This is particularly intuitive for the United States, where, over
its two-century history, the Constitution has seen relatively few formal
amendments.117 Indeed, the relatively low populism score for the U.S. Constitution
(of 45%) is likely the result of the document’s old age. At the same time, it is also
possible that a constitution’s age is a less important predictor of its popularity than
the U.S. experience would suggest. Foreign constitutions tend to be substantially
younger than the venerable U.S. Constitution.118 Around the world, the average
national constitution lasts only nineteen years before it is replaced altogether and is
amended frequently in between.119 Indeed, it is striking that constitutions have
lasted exactly as long as Thomas Jefferson said they should last when he famously
argued that because “the earth belongs to the living,” the constitution should be
updated every generation, which he defined as nineteen years.120 Because so many
of the world’s constitutions were written or amended within the current generation,
their disconnect from popular values is unlikely to be a product of their age alone.
Second, it seems that constitutions adopted in a process involving popular
participation are more likely to reflect substantive popular opinion. Where people
are actively involved in constitution-making, they are likely to push for their own
views and values.121 On the other hand, as hypothesized in Part II, procedural
involvement does not automatically guarantee that constitutions will track popular

117. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the U.S.
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 763, 765 (2012) (describing how the U.S. Constitution is
unusual from a global perspective).
118. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 129 (reporting that the “median survival time”
of a constitution is nineteen years).
119. Id. at 129.
120. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958); (stating the self-evident proposition
that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living”); id. at 393–94 (calculating that 18.8 years is
the age of a generation, and concluding that “19 years is the term beyond which neither the
representatives of a nation, nor even the whole nation itself assembled, can validly extend a
debt”); id. at 396 (“Every constitution, then, and every law, naturally expires at the end of
19[] years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right.”).
121. See supra Part I (discussing the relationship between popular participation and
constitutions that substantively reflect popular values).
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opinion, especially when popular involvement is limited to a yes-or-no vote in a
referendum. Third, it seems plausible that if a constitution proclaims fidelity to
popular values by enshrining the rhetoric of national identity and values in its
preamble, its menu of rights might also match popular opinion.122 In that case, a
genuine commitment to popular values is reflected both in the preamble and the bill
of rights. Fourth, it is possible that constitutions that contain relatively few rights
will enjoy lower levels of popular support than a constitution that contains
numerous rights, because people generally favor an expansive catalogue of
rights.123
Country characteristics may also be associated with constitutional populism.
First, it is possible that democratic countries produce constitutions that better
reflect popular opinion. Second, perhaps economic welfare affects the degree to
which constitutions are connected to popular values. Specifically, wealthier
countries could be inherently more capable of honoring constitutional obligations,
and their propensity to deliver those rights might make them more likely to promise
them in the first place.124 Finally, the degree to which a country is willing and able
to uphold its constitutional promises may affect the degree to which the
constitution is connected to popular values. In particular, it is possible that
constitutions that are closely connected to popular values are aspirational in nature;
that is, they represent unfulfilled hopes for the future rather than rights that are
upheld here and now.125 Likewise, regimes that have no intention of ever upholding
the rights they promise might write documents that appeal to popular sentiments
and, yet, are utterly meaningless in practice.126 In both cases, populist constitutions
are most likely to be found among nations that do not uphold their constitutional
promises in practice.
Empirical exploration of what explains populist constitutions lends support to
only some of these hypotheses.127 I used regression analysis to explore which
variables correlate with constitutional populism. The predictor variables included in
this regression are (1) the age of the constitution, measured by the number of years

122. See supra Part I (discussing how nations may pay fidelity to popular values by
adopting a preamble packed with rhetoric on national values and identity).
123. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing how people usually vote in
favor of more rights).
124. The empirical literature has repeatedly found that wealthy countries tend to possess
superior human rights practices. See Gerald L. Blasi & David Louis Cingranelli, Do
Constitutions and Institutions Help Protect Human Rights?, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 223, 225–26 (Stuart S. Nagel & David Louis Cingranelli eds.,
1996) (summarizing the relevant literature).
125. See Michael Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1632
(2009) (describing the concept of an “aspirational constitution”).
126. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 898–900 (documenting empirically that a
substantial portion of the world’s constitutions are sham constitutions).
127. To be specific, I estimated an ordinary least squares regression model. To address
serial correlation of the error terms, the model includes a lagged dependent variable and
calculates robust standard errors clustered at the country level. I also re-estimated the same
model when including country fixed-effects while excluding the lagged dependent variable,
and the results are largely similar to those presented in Table 11.
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since it was last revised or adopted;128 (2) whether or not the constitution was
drafted with popular input, and specifically, whether it was ratified through a
popular referendum;129 (3) whether a constitution signals populist commitments in
its preamble by referring to the nation’s past;130 (4) whether a constitutional bill of
rights is comprehensive and contains an expansive menu of rights;131 (5) whether a
country is democratic;132 (6) the economic welfare of a country as measured by the
natural log of its GDP per capita;133 and (7) the degree to which a constitution
upholds its commitments.134 Table 8 summarizes the results from this empirical
model.
Given the difficulties surrounding causal inference in a cross-country setting,
results from this analysis should not be interpreted as causal relationships.
Nonetheless, the analysis reveals some interesting correlations. First, it appears that
younger constitutions are more likely to be connected to popular values. Thus,
when constitutions have not been amended for a while, they fall out of step with
evolving popular opinion. Second, the sheer number of constitutional rights is also
a statistically significant predictor of constitutional populism, which lends some
credibility to the hypothesis that people typically favor including a comprehensive
catalogue of rights. Thus, the more rights a document contains, the more closely it
usually tracks popular opinion. Third, constitutional performance is also correlated
with how populist constitutions are. Specifically, the more constitutional rights are
upheld in reality, the less likely that the document will be populist in nature. This
finding suggests that populist constitutions are mostly aspirational in character.
Eritrea, for example, is the most populist constitution as of 2010, and yet, it only
upholds a small fraction of its promises in practice.135 Finally, the analysis reveals a
relationship between economic welfare and constitutional populism, specifically,
that wealthier countries possess more populist constitutions.
The other variables are not statistically significant predictors of constitutional
populism. As it turns out, democracy is not statistically significantly correlated

128. By measuring constitutional age as the number of years since a constitution was last
amended in any way (in the case of constitutions that have never been amended, the number
of years since initial adoption), I seek to avoid the difficulties involved in attempting to
distinguish between amendments that effectively rewrite a constitution and amendments that
are relatively insubstantial. See Law & Versteeg supra note 80 (describing the difficulties in
drawing such distinctions).
129. This variable is taken from the Comparative Constitutions Project. See supra note
43 (introducing the data). I thank Justin Blount, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton for
sharing this data.
130. This variable is based on my own coding of all of the world’s written constitutions.
See supra Part I.A for an introduction and graphical representation.
131. This variable was taken from Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1266–68
(describing how this variable was constructed from the constitutions of 188 countries written
between 1946 and 2006).
132. See supra note 102 (describing the polity2 democracy variable).
133. See supra note 103 (describing the GDP variable).
134. Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 886 (introducing a numerical measure that
captures the degree to which any government honors its constitutional commitments).
135. Id. at 898 (singling out the Eritrean Constitution as the second most “sham”
constitution in 2010).
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with constitutional populism. Thus, constitutions created by democracies are no
more likely to substantively reflect popular values than are those created by
autocracies. Populist rhetoric in the preamble is not statistically significantly
related to constitutional populism in the bill of rights either. Perhaps most
surprising is the finding that popular referendums do not produce more populist
constitutions. Presumably this finding reflects that referendums allow only for
limited popular input: a mere yes-or-no vote on the full package of proposed
revisions.136 Procedural involvement, thus, is no guarantee that constitutions will
substantively track popular views and values. At the same time, it is still possible
that other types of involvement in the drafting stage do result in constitutions that
substantively reflect popular values. Further research is required to explore the
connection between procedural involvement and the content of the constitution
itself.
Table 8. Predictors of Constitutional Populism

Age of the constitution
Constitutional underperformance
Comprehensiveness of constitution
Adopted by referendum
References to history in preamble
Democracy
GDP per capita (natural log)
Lagged dependent variable
R2
N

-0.011***
-1.376***
-0.442*
0.023
0.258
-0.004
0.194**
0.880***
0.97
913

Note: Coefficients from OLS regression with lagged dependent variable *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% confidence level, ** denotes statistical significance at the
5% confidence level, and * denotes statistical significance at the 10% confidence level.

V. DO PEOPLE WANT THEIR CONSTITUTION TO BE POPULIST?
The disconnect between constitutional choices and popular values is not in and
of itself indicative of an unpopular constitutionalism. It is possible that people do
not always want their constitutions to reflect all the principles that they value in
life. For instance, perhaps some people who deeply value the environment do not
want to enshrine a right to a healthy environment in their constitution; they might
worry, for instance, that doing so would unduly increase the size of the government
and would delegate too much power to the judiciary. The remainder of this Part
will explore this possibility.

136. See supra Part I.B (describing the limited participation in a popular referendum).
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A. Unpopular Constitutionalism
An exploration of whether people want their constitution to reflect their values
requires new survey data. None of the World Values Survey questions inquire
about the people’s views on their constitution, and to my knowledge, no such
survey exists. To gauge whether what people want from life corresponds with what
they want from their constitution, I designed my own survey on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk is an “online crowdsourcing system that allows
users to distribute work to a large number of online respondents.”137 This work is
broken down into simple one-time tasks for which respondents are paid to
complete. Mechanical Turk is used for a wide variety of tasks, which increasingly
includes survey research by social scientists.138
The survey was available online from January 30 to April 15, 2013, and was
completed by 1029 respondents from eleven countries, about half of whom were
from the United States.139 The survey exactly replicated the questions from the
World Values Survey,140 but for each question about values, it asked a follow-up
question on whether the respondent would want to enshrine the same values in the
constitution. For example, after asking whether the respondent finds homosexuality
justifiable (using the same scoring as in the World Values Survey),141 the
respondent would be asked whether he or she wants to include a protection of
equality regardless of sexual orientation in the constitution.142 Mechanical Turk
workers tend to fairly closely approximate a random sample of the population, but
female workers and younger workers are somewhat overrepresented.143 For that
reason, the survey also included questions that ask for the respondent’s age, gender,
and political ideology, so that these features can be controlled for in the subsequent
analysis.

137. Joel Ross, Andrew Zaldivar, Lilly Irani, Bill Tomlinson & M. Six Silberman, Who
Are the Crowdworkers? Shifting Demographics in Mechanical Turk, in CHI ’10 EXTENDED
ABSTRACTS ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2863, 2863–64 (2010) (describing
the basic principles of Amazon’s crowd-sourced virtual workplace).
138. See, e.g., Michael Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, A New Source of Inexpensive Yet High-Quality Data?, 6 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1, 3 (2011) (suggesting that Mechanical Turk yields inexpensive but
high-quality data for psychology researchers that is more demographically diverse that most
internet surveys).
139. Specifically, the survey was taken by 522 people from the United States, 399 people
from India, 51 people from Canada, 20 people from Pakistan, 12 from Germany, 10 from
Australia, 5 from France, 4 from South Africa, 3 from Croatia, 2 from the Netherlands, and 1
from Kenya. Depending on the country, respondents were paid between twenty-five cents and
one dollar to complete the survey.
140. See supra Table 1.
141. See supra Table 1.
142. On average, people spent 3.8 minutes on the survey. Respondents that took less than
60 seconds to complete the survey were omitted from the analysis.
143. Ross et al., supra note 137, at 2865 (suggesting that the workers on Mechanical
Turk are diverse and closely resemble the population as a whole, but that the workforce is
disproportionately made up of female and younger people).

1172

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:1133

Of course, the survey does not provide a fully accurate description on the
constitutional opinions of the world population at large. Even if the sample were
fully random, the sample size is not large enough to draw such inferences.
Sampling the world population at large would require an undertaking of the
magnitude of the World Values Survey, with a global network of social
scientists.144 The purpose of the survey presented in this sub-Part is more modest.
Its goal is merely to provide a first sense of whether people typically want their
values enshrined in their constitution, or whether they are reluctant to demand
some of the rights that they value in the abstract. Further research will be required
to provide a more definite answer to this question.
The main impression from the surveys is that, overwhelmingly, people do want
to enshrine their values in the constitution. Table 9 lists for each survey question
the percentage of respondents that deeply value a certain right, as well as the
percentage of respondents that deeply value the right and want to enshrine it in
their constitution. The table reveals that, in most cases, people who value a right
also want to enshrine it in their constitution: 90% of those who hold traditional
family values want to protect the family in their constitution; 91% of those who
value gender equality want the constitution to protect gender equality in labor; 84%
of those who value the environment want environmental protection in their
constitution; 92% of those willing to engage in a legal assembly want to enshrine a
right to assembly in their constitution; 88% of those who think homosexuality is
justifiable want gay rights included in their constitution; and 89% of those who
value motherhood want to enshrine a protection of motherhood in the constitution.
The smallest congruity lies in the right to rest; only 54% of those who believe that
leisure time is important think that a right to rest should be constitutionalized.

144. See supra Part III (describing the World Values Survey data).
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Table 9. Proportion of people that value a right and also want to enshrine it in the
constitution

Right

Percentage of
respondents that
value the right

Percentage who
values the right
and want to
enshrine it in
their constitution

Protection of the family (percentage of respondents
with traditional family values)

679/1007 (67%)

608/679 (90%)

Right to rest (percentage of respondents that considers
leisure time to be very important)

945/1014 (93%)

519/954 (54%)

Right to work (percentage of people that considers
work very important)

902/1013 (89%)

664/902 (74%)

683/1008 (68%)

576/683 (84%)

748/1015 (74%)

535/748 (72%)

Right to petition (percentage of people who would be
willing to petition their government)

910/1017 (89%)

776/910 (85%)

Right to assembly (percentage of people who want to
participate in a legal assembly)

860/1016 (85%)

788/860 (92%)

Right to strike (percentage of people willing to go on a
legal strike)

675/1014 (67%)

545/675 (81%)

Equality regardless of sexual orientation (percentage of
people who thinks homosexuality is acceptable)

564/1013 (56%)

499/564 (88%)

Right to life for unborn (percentage of people that
considers abortion unacceptable)

525/1025 (51%)

376/525 (72%)

Gender equality in labor (percentage of people who do
not believe that in times of job scarcity, men have
more right to a job than women)

778/1018 (76%)

705/778 (91%)

Protection of motherhood (percentage of people that
believe that women need to have children in order
to be fulfilled)

349/1009 (35%)

309/349 (89%)

Right to healthy environment (percentage of people
willing to pay for increased environmental
protection)
Right to get married (percentage of people who
disagree that marriage is an outdated institution)

When exploring these same relationships in twelve separate regressionsin
which respondents’ willingness to enshrine each of the twelve rights in their
constitution are the dependent variablesa similar impression emerges. Each of
these regressions include the following predictor variables: (1) whether the
respondent finds the values that correspond with the right very important; (2) the
respondent’s age; (3) the respondent’s gender; (4) the respondent’s self-proclaimed
political ideology (progressive or conservative); and (5) whether the respondent was
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based in the United States.145 The results (presented in Table 10) reveal that, with the
sole exception of gender equality in labor relations, people who deeply value a right
also prefer that their constitution protects that right. These findings are statistically
significant even when controlling for attributes like age, gender, political ideology,
and geographical location. When combined with the findings from the previous Part,
these findings suggest that constitutions are not only detached from popular values,
but that this disconnect is unsupported by popular opinion. As a result, the global
practice of constitution-making appears to be characterized by unpopular
constitutionalism.
Of course, the surveys were not completed under the conditions of a constitutional
moment, in which the people transcend their ordinary shortsighted self-interest and
pay fidelity to the common good.146 In theory, it is possible that respondents would
feel differently when they are actually writing a constitution, in such a constitutional
moment of heightened deliberation. Indeed, in theory, this could even explain why
constitutions ratified through popular referendum do not reflect popular values:
because the people change their values when writing a constitution. Though the
constitutional moment is a powerful construct in constitutional theory, there is little
evidence that real-world constitutions are written under such conditions.147 In fact,
the prevailing evidence suggests the opposite: constitutions are commonly written by
experts, self-interested elites,148 imposed by outsiders,149 and copied and pasted from
elsewhere.150 Even in the rare cases in which constitutional moments occur, it is
unlikely that people will set aside their values on contested moral issues such as
abortion or gay rights. In the absence of any evidence that people change their views
at times of constitution-making, the survey data presented in this Article suggests that
the global practice of constitution-making is characterized by an unpopular
constitutionalism.

145. Specifically, I estimated an ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors
clustered at the country level.
146. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
147. See Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce
Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 764, 776–92 (1992) (noting
that “Ackerman assumes rather than demonstrates the existence of constitutional moments” and
showing, based on historical research, the American Founding was not free of political
self-interest); András Sajó, Constitution without the Constitutional Moment: View from the New
Member States, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 243, 243 (2005) (noting that the constitutions of the United
States, Belgium, and maybe post-apartheid South Africa were written during a constitutional
moment, but that the “overwhelming majority” of constitutions were not).
148. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM passim (2004) (describing constitution-making as a product of
“self-preservation” by hegemonic elites).
149. See generally Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Baghdad, Tokyo,
Kabul . . . : Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1139 (2008).
150. See Goderis & Versteeg, supra note 82 (describing constitutional imposition in over
thirty former British colonies in Africa and the Caribbean as well as in Japan, Micronesia,
Germany, Afghanistan, Iraq, and others).
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B. An Unpopular U.S. Constitution?
Americans might be different. The survey responses reveal a striking difference
between respondents in the United States and those in other countries. Unlike their
foreign counterparts, Americans tend not to want all of their personal values
constitutionalized, specifically those that are positive or socioeconomic in nature. While
much has been said about American exceptionalism in the constitutional realm,151 the
survey results tentatively suggest that one of the most exceptional traits of U.S.
constitutional lawthe distinctly libertarian character of the Federal U.S.
Constitution152in fact appears to be supported by popular opinion.153
This contrast between Americans and foreign respondents is apparent from the
regression results reported in Table 10. Specifically, compared with foreign
respondentsand controlling for attributes like age, gender, ideology as well as how
much respondents value each right in the abstractAmericans are systematically less
likely to demand constitutional protections for the family, a right to rest, a right to work,
a right to a healthy environment, a protection of marriage, rights for the unborn, gender
equality in labor relations, and a protection of motherhood.
The finding raises the possibility that Americans do not want to constitutionalize all
of their values, and invites a reconsideration of the populist constitution score for the
U.S. Constitution presented in Part V.A of this Article. Specifically, to gauge the true
popularity of the U.S. Constitution, it might be more insightful to consider which rights
Americans actually want in their constitution, rather than to what extent each right aligns
with their personal beliefs. In other words, we will have to consider Americans’
constitutional values rather than their personal values. To facilitate such an analysis,
Table 11 presents, for each right included in the analysis, (1) the percentage of
Americans that values the right and (2) the percentage of Americans that actually want
the right in their constitution. These numbers are based on the Mechanical Turk survey

151. See generally AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 65
(describing how the United States is a global outlier in free speech, the death penalty, and
socioeconomic rights, amongst other things).
152. See HARTZ, supra note 79, at 6 (explaining the distinctly libertarian constitutional
tradition of the United States); EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES:
WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 12 (2013) (noting that the
conventional wisdom about the American constitutional tradition is that “protective and
redistributive policies are questions of majoritarian choice, not matters of constitutional duty”);
Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 46 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (“American distrust of government is a
contributing factor to a strongly libertarian approach to constitutional rights. The Constitution of
the United States is a strongly negative constitution, and viewing the constitution as the vehicle
for social rights, community rights, or positive citizen entitlements of any kind is . . . highly
disfavored.”); Dieter Grimm, The Protective Function of the State, in EUROPEAN AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 77, at 119 (noting that negative rights characterize the U.S.
constitutional tradition and attributing this to America’s lack of feudalism).
153. Cf. Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (showing empirically that
many U.S. state constitutions do include socioeconomic rights).
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conducted by the author, while the World Values Survey numbers are listed for
comparison.154
The table reveals that there exists some discrepancy between the degree to which
Americans value rights in the abstract, and whether they want to enshrine these in the
Constitution. To illustrate, 90% and 87% of American respondents value leisure time
and work, respectively, but only 35% of all Americans want a right to rest or leisure in
the Constitution and only 57% would want a constitutional right to work.155 When
recalculating the U.S. populism score based on Americans’ constitutional values rather
than their personal values (the percentage of people that want or do not want each right
in the Constitution, rather than the percentage that value or do not value the right in the
abstract), the average support for the menu of rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution
increases somewhat: 48% of Americans get the rights they wanted.
Even though Americans agree with the omission of some rights from the
Constitution, they disagree with the omission of others. Specifically, the survey reveals
that there are high levels of popular support for some rights that are omitted from the text
of the U.S. Constitution156. Specifically, 88% of respondents want to enshrine a
protection for gender equality in labor relations; 77% want to enshrine gay rights; 70%
of respondents want a right to strike in the constitution; and 62% would want a
constitutional right to a healthy environment. It is these types of omissions that decrease
the popularity of the U.S. Constitution and make the average provision included in the
analysis fall short of a majority.
Another difference between the United States and foreign countries is that many
rights that are protected under U.S. constitutional law are not explicitly enshrined in the

154. In general, the results from the Mechanical Turk survey are fairly similar to the results
from the World Values Survey. Note that with a fully random sample, and a survey size of 522
American respondents, there would have been a margin of error of 4.3%. See Sample Size
Calculator, SURV. SYS., http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm. As can be seen, for a number
of rights, the difference between the Mechanical Turk Survey and the WVS survey data falls
within the margin of error, but for others, it does not. One possible cause for the discrepancy is
that the last wave of WVS data collection in the United States took place in 2006, and values
might have changed since then. Another possible cause is that my sample of Mechanical Turk
workers is not fully random; this is why the regression analysis controls for attributes such as
ideology age and gender. To illustrate how both of these effects might be at work, consider the
data on gay rights, for which the discrepancy between the WVS findings and the finding from my
survey is largest. According to the World Values Survey, 70% of Americans think that
homosexuality is unacceptable, while according to the Mechanical Turk survey only 27% thinks
that homosexuality is unacceptable. This difference may reflect a sample selection bias, since the
younger Mechanical Turk workers are more likely to be supportive of gay rights. Yet it is also
possible that the discrepancy results from rapidly changing values on gay rights in America. See
David A. Fahrenthold & Jon Cohen, Record Support for Gay Marriage, WASH. POST, March 19,
2013, at A1 (documenting that 41% of Americans supported gay marriage in 2004, 36%
supported gay marriage in 2006, and 58% supported gay marriage in 2013). In fact, the 73%
support measured in my survey is larger than both the 58% in the Washington Post survey and the
30% support measured by the World Values Survey in 2006.
155. Among the 90% of Americans that deeply value leisure time, 36% want to enshrine a
right to leisure in the Constitution; among the 82% of Americans that deeply value work, 59%
wants to enshrine a right to work in the Constitution.
156. See Table 10.
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Constitution itself but have been created through judicial interpretations. The
U.S. Constitution has seen relatively few formal amendments, but it is updated almost
daily through judicial interpretation.157 In contrast with the venerable U.S. Constitution,
foreign constitutions tend to be both younger and substantially more detailed,158 thereby
leaving less time and discretion for foreign courts to update their constitutional
documents. As a result, most countries’ constitutional texts are more important to their
respective systems than is the United States’. Indeed, the gap between the written “largeC” constitution and the broader body of constitutional lawor the nation’s “small-c”
constitutionis larger in the United States than in any other foreign country.159
Three of the rights that feature in the analysis have arguably been recognized by the
Supreme Court, even though they are not explicitly enshrined in the Constitution. These
are the right to get married, the protection of gender equality in labor relations, and, as of
very recently, gay rights.160 In these cases, the Supreme Court has updated the
Constitution to more closely conform to popular opinion. Indeed, according to some
commentators, constitutional interpretation is never immune from popular opinion.161
Professor Leider, for example, has shown that the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment
jurisprudence has always tracked evolving popular opinion and reflects a desire on the
part of the court to “accommodate a population divided between those believing in the
right and those seeking stronger restrictions on weapons.”162 The recent overturning of
the Defense of Marriage Act might reflect a similar desire. According to the Mechanical
Turk survey, which was conducted right before the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Windsor,163 78% of Americans support a constitutional protection of equality
regardless of sexual orientation.164 By deciding the case the way it did, the Supreme
Court thus brought the Constitution further in line with popular values.
When taking into account that these rights are in fact protected in the larger body of
constitutional law, the popularity score of the U.S. Constitution changes from 48% to
60%. In other words, between the constitutional text and judicial interpretations, U.S.
constitutional law grants a majority of 60% of Americans the rights they want. Thus,
when considering Americans’ distinct constitutional values as well as the interpretations
by the Supreme Court, the U.S. constitutional system is closer to popular opinion than it
appears at first sight.

157. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 13, at 129 (reporting that the median survival time of
the world’s constitutions is nineteen years).
158. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 153 (describing empirically how the U.S.
constitution is unusually brief and stable by global standards).
159. Id. at 25 (noting that the U.S. Constitution is the oldest national constitution in the
world, and among the four briefest democratic constitutions in existance, and observing that
this entails an unusual delegation of constitution-making authority to the judiciary).
160. To determine whether each of the twelve rights covered in my analysis are
recognized in constitutional law, I rely on the quantitative coding by Kevin L. Cope, who
coded the presence of 112 rights in U.S. constitutional law. See Kevin L. Cope, The Global
Relevance of U.S. Constitutional Law (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(describing the cases in which the Supreme Court recognized a protection of marriage and a
prohibition of gender discrimination in labor by the government).
161. See supra note 30.
162. Leider, supra note 30, at 3.
163. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
164. See supra note 154 (discussing potential selection bias in my survey).
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Table 11. Personal and Constitutional Values for American Respondents
Right Included
_________________________________________________

Right corresponds
with personal values

Right corresponds
with constitutional values

Right to Petition

People who would be willing to
petition their government: 94%
(95% WVS)

People who want a right to petition in
their constitution: 83%

Right to
Assembly

People who want to participate in a
legal assembly: 83% (69% WVS)

People who want a right to assembly in
their constitution: 92%

Right Not Included
_________________________________________________

Right does not correspond
with personal values

Right does not correspond
with constitutional values

Protection of
Family

People who do not have traditional
family values: 52% (36% WVS)

Right to Rest

People who do not consider leisure
time to be very important: 10%
(11% WVS)
People who do not consider work
very important: 17 % (20% WVS)
People who do not value the
environment : 39% (49% WVS)

People who do not want a right a
protection of family life in the
constitution: 33%
People who do not want a right to rest
in the constitution: 65%

Right to Work
Right to
Environment
Right to
Marriage
Right to Strike
Gay Rights

Rights for
Unborn
Gender equality

Protection of
motherhood

Total

People who agree that marriage is
an outdated institution: 30% (12%
WVS)
People who are not willing to go
on a legal strike: 33% (56% WVS)
People who do not think
homosexuality is acceptable: 27%
(70% WVS)
People that consider abortion
acceptable: 58% (31% WVS)
People who do not value gender
equality in labor : 5% (7% WVS)
People who do not believe that
women need to have children in
order to be fulfilled: 92% (86%
WVS)
Americans whose personal values
align with constitution: 44% (45%
WVS)

People who do not want a right to
work in the constitution: 43%
People who do not want a right to
healthy
environment
in
the
constitution: 38%
People who do not want a right to get
married in the constitution: 45%
People who do not want a right to
strike in the constitution: 30%
People who do not want gay rights in
the constitution: 23%
People who do not want a right to life
for unborn in the constitution: 65%
People who do not want a right to
gender equality in labor relations in the
constitution: 12%
People who do not want a protection of
motherhood in the constitution: 48%

Americans whose constitutional values
align with constitution: 48%

N = 522
Note: The italicization in the first column denotes the rights not explicitly enumerated in the
Constitution, but that are nonetheless protected under U.S. constitutional law.
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VI. POSSIBLE CAUSES OF UNPOPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
In constitutional theory, as well as popular imagination, constitutions are widely
regarded as distinct expressions of popular views and values.165 The findings from
this Article suggest that it might be necessary to re-evaluate this idea. Although the
findings should be interpreted with some caution, all the available evidence
suggests that constitutions are mostly disconnected from popular values, even in
democratic countries and in countries where the document was ratified through a
popular referendum. This Part sets forth a possible explanation for why unpopular
constitutionalism appears to prevail in so many countries around the world.
To understand the disconnect, it is important to note that constitutions are not
usually written by the people as a whole. Most of the time, they tend to be drafted
by small groups of experts who are consulted by international organizations as well
as special interest groups, mainly in the form of national and international
nongovernmental organizations.166 Only after a draft has been agreed upon, it is
deliberated by democratically elected bodies and/or put to the people for
ratification. Moreover, in the majority of cases, popular approval is still not sought
at all.167 Thus, the experts that write the constitutions often do so in relative
insulation from democratic pressures. And in designing the nation’s highest
document, these experts do not merely consider majoritarian sentiments but
balance these against a host of competing considerations that might contradict the
goal of popular self-expression.
Assuming that the constitution-drafters do not simply seek to enshrine their own
preferences and values but think about the greater good, there exist two important
considerations compete with the desire to express popular views and values. These
competing considerations are functionalism and universalism. Universalism holds
that all constitutions should enshrine certain universal valuesmost notably
relating to rightsregardless of the wishes of the majority. Universalist
considerations caution constitutional designers against popular self-expression
because populist constitutions potentially undermine universal human rights
norms.168 Functionalism counsels against populist constitutions because those
documents are more likely to be technically unsound: for example, they often
enshrine an overly broad catalogue of rights.169 Both functionalism and
universalism, then, are possible causes of unpopular constitutionalism.
A. Functionalism
For real-world constitution-makers, constitutions are not merely forums to
express popular values; they also represent an opportunity to design the nation and

165. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part II.B (describing the recent trend towards popular participation, and
noting that 34% of constitutions currently in force require ratification through a popular
referendum).
168. See infra Part VI.B.
169. See infra Part VI.A.
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to strategically achieve certain goals.170 From a functionalist perspective, the
constitution is less the “soul of the nation” than it is the country’s operating
system.171 To perform well, both a country and a computer need a technically
superior operating system. Constitutions, then, are ideally like Windows 8 or
Apple’s Mountain Lion, and constitution-makers are engineers with the technical
expertise to find optimal constitutional solutions.172 Through constitutional design,
constitutions can promote desirable goals such as economic welfare,173 a lasting
respect for rights and liberty,174 stable democracy,175 and the mitigation of conflict
in divided societies.176
Under the logic of functional constitutional design, constitutionalism implies a
set of substantive constitutional principles to which designers must adhere if they
are to achieve a well-functioning government. Such principles tend to be
standardized and do not usually depend on context.177 As Professor Tom Ginsburg
explains, constitution-making often starts with “boilerplate” constitutional
provisions that represent easily available and technically sound solutions for
constitutional design.178 Instead of starting from scratch, constitution-makers draw
on available boilerplates. To return to the computer analogy, it might be foolish to
design a new operating system from whole cloth if Windows 8 or Apple’s
Mountain Lion were already available.

170. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 34, at 68, 72 (suggesting that a functionalist approach
is promoted by political scientists who seek to identify the best constitutional solutions). See
generally ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION (2000).
171. E.g., Kreimer, supra note 13, at 641–44 (contrasting the notion that the constitution
is “the soul of the nation” with the idea that constitutions serve as nations’ operating
systems).
172. On the “science” of constitutional design, see DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2006); Ran Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional
“Success,” 87 TEX. L. REV 1339 (2009).
173. For the view that constitutions promote economic welfare, see, for example,
COOTER, supra note 170; TORSTEN PERSSON & GUIDO TABELLINI, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF
CONSTITUTIONS (2003).
174. For the view that bills of rights promote liberty, see, for example, PROMOTING
HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Philip Alston ed.,
1999).
175. For the view that constitutions can design democracy, see, for example, CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO (2001).
176. For the view that constitutions can mitigate conflict in divided societies, see, for
example, CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETY: INTEGRATION OR
ACCOMMODATION? (Sujit Choudhrey ed., 2008); Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory
Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1213 (2008); Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, 15 J. DEMOCRACY
96 (2004).
177. See Peter C. Ordeshook, Are ‘Western’ Constitutions Relevant to Anything Other
than the Countries They Serve?, 13 CONST. POL. ECON. 3, 3 (2002) (“There necessarily exists
universal principles of democratic constitutional design, even if those principles remain
largely undiscovered.”).
178. Tom Ginsburg, Constitutions as Contract, Constitutions as Charters, in THE SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24, at 182, 196 (describing
boilerplate constitutional provisions).
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Functionalism appears to be a common sentiment in constitution-making.179 The
U.S. Constitution, for example, was carefully engineered by its drafters, who had
extensively studied the available insights from political science and constitutional
experiences elsewhere. In the same spirit, the drafters of the 1922 Irish Free State
Constitution did a “diligent search” of numerous foreign constitutions, which were
carefully studied to get new insights on how to best “engineer” Irish society. 180
Most recently, the 2011 South Sudanese Constitution was written under the
auspices of a cadre of foreign consultants who advised the South Sudanese drafters
on the wisdom of their proposed choices.181 Functional constitutional design is thus
akin to a science, as part of which experts prescribe optimal constitutional solutions
to each nation.182 Such functional recipes for constitutional design, however, are
likely to be disconnected from popular opinion.
B. Universalism
Real-world constitution-makers do not merely balance the demands of
democratic constitutional theory against functional considerations, but also against
universalism: the belief that some values are so important that they should be
enshrined in constitutions everywhere.183 From a universalist viewpoint, all
constitutions are to contain certain universal rights norms, regardless of popular
opinion.184
A body of sociological research has demonstrated that the international
community is increasingly characterized by standardized models of statehood.185

179. Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, Transnational Constitutionalism: A Conceptual
Framework, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 24,
at 103 (documenting widespread borrowing in constitution-making around the globe, from
nineteenth century Latin America, to post-colonial Africa, to Iceland, and South Sudan
today).
180. Paul Brady, Social, Political and Philosophical Foundations of the Irish
Constitutional Order, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 24, at 269, 274.
181. See Cope, supra note 34, at 304 (describing the cadre of foreign experts involved in
the drafting of the 2011 South Sudanese Transitional Constitution, ranging from the National
Democratic Institute, the Max Planck Institute, to the American law firm Latham &
Watkins).
182. See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 13, at 265 (noting that constitution-making involves
“consultations with (if not management by) international actors (governmental and
nongovernmental organizations), concerning constitutional design (including voting
systems), constitutional rights, and constitutional enforcement mechanisms”); Jed
Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971,
1992–93 (2004) (describing the prevalence of “international constitutions” that are primarily
drafted by foreign consultants).
183. Tushnet, supra note 34, at 67, 69 (describing normative universalism as the idea that
the same universal values apply everywhere).
184. Id. at 69 (“Normative universalism emerges primarily from the dialogue between
those who study comparative constitutional law and those who study international human
rights.”).
185. See John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas & Francisco O. Ramirez, World
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Especially in the area of human rights, there now exists an internationally defined
human rights paradigm that has equipped the international community with explicit
formal standards against which states can be evaluated.186 States that view
themselves as members of the international community will self-consciously
conform to those standards to gain international legitimacy.
This international paradigm is most prominently enshrined in the core United
Nations human rights treaties. As a normative matter, the very premise of the
international human rights regime is that some rights are universal, no matter where
you are born.187 Since the Second World War, a growing number of rights are
protected by international law.188 These treaties are widely ratified by, and thus
legally binding upon, the largest majority of states. Many of these rights have
achieved the status of customary international law, making them legally binding
even upon states that did not ratify these treaties.189 In addition to their legal status,
human rights treaties have strong normative appeal because they represent a global
consensus among nation states. By design, international human rights treaties seek
to articulate and advance a global consensus on human rights.190 States that want to
signal good intentions to the international community, and self-consciously aim to
be part of that community, are therefore likely to conform to the standardized
constitutional models enshrined in international human rights treaties.191
Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 144–45 (1997) (“Many features of the
contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated
through global cultural and associational processes.”).
186. David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Constitutional Variation Among Strains of
Authoritarianism, in CONSTITUTIONS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 165, 170 (Tom Ginsburg
& Alberto Simpser eds., 2014).
187. E.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 (1990) (“Human rights are universal:
they belong to every human being in every human society. They do not differ with
geography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system, or stage of societal
development.”).
188. See, e.g., TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 4
(2005) (“[E]ven the most optimistic observers in 1948 could not have imagined the
subsequent growth and influence of human rights discourse and doctrine. . . . .” (citation
omitted)); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 36 (2009) (“The most striking fact about the international law of human
rights is its nearly complete absence prior to the end of World War II.”).
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 (1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing
the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimination or (g) a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”).
190. Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights
Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 483, 488 (2001) (“The treaty system has
largely defined the international consensus on human rights norms . . . .”).
191. See, e.g., GRAHAM HASSALL & CHERYL SAUNDERS, ASIA-PACIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL
SYSTEMS 1 (2002) (“The [Universal] Declaration of Human Rights . . . must surely have had
more impact on thinking about law, constitutionalism and governance than any other
document produced in the last century.”); JACKSON, supra note 13, at 40 (“[M]any foreign
constitutions drafted since World War II rely on international human rights instruments (or
on other constitutions that relied on these instruments) as archetypes, leading to parallel
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While rooted in different logics, functionalism and universalism both produce
standardized documents,192 rather than distinct statements of national values that
serve to differentiate nations from one another. And in practice, they often blend
together, presenting constitutional designers with a limited number of standardized
models, and limiting designers’ discretion to express any popular values that would
deviate from these models.193
C. The Dilemma for Constitutional Design
Functionalism and universalism may, at times, contradict the ideal of popular
self-expression. At first blush, it may seem that the expression of national values,
the articulation of universal norms, and the functional design of certain objectives
can all be achieved with the same instrument.194 For example, the preamble could
proclaim the nation’s values, the bill of rights could enshrine a standardized
package of universal rights, and state-of-the-art principles of constitutional design
could be brought to bear on the structural part of the constitution. Yet where
national values are more than rhetorical statements and permeate the substantive
portion of the constitution, a tension can emerge. Popular values can clash both
with functionalism’s recipes for constitutional design and with universalism’s
notion that a core set of rights should be adopted everywhere.
To illustrate the former, consider the example of socioeconomic rights. In
developing countries, as elsewhere, the people value deeply the right to food, the
right to housing, and the right to an adequate standard of living. In fact, alleviating
poverty and malnutrition may be a leading goal for the future.195 But when the
government is incapable of fulfilling these rights, there exists a risk that including
them will relegate the entire constitution to a merely aspirational document. That is,
if the government routinely violates the right to food, for example, it will come as
less of a surprise when it does the same for the prohibition of torture.196 As a result,
functionalism counsels against popular self-expression on socioeconomic rights.
rights-protecting provisions.”); Heyns & Viljoen, supra note 190, at 500 (noting, based on
case-study research, that the human rights instruments promulgated by the United Nations
have strongly influenced constitution-making in various countries).
192. See Tushnet, supra note 34, at 67, 74 (noting that both functionalists and
universalists look for universal principles).
193. Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1163–64 (finding that ninety percent of all variation
in the world’s constitutions is explained by two underlying dimensions: (1) the general
tendency of a country to include few or many rights and (2) whether the document is more
statist or libertarian in nature).
194. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 13, at 648–50 (conceptualizing constitutions as
national identity and contrasting it with constitutions as operating systems); Mark Tushnet,
The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1269–74 (1999)
(conceptualizing the “expressive” function of constitutions and contrasting it with more
functionalist perspectives on constitutions).
195. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 82, at 868 (noting that Chad’s constitution promises
free and universal education, even though only one third of the population is literate, and
Afghanistan’s constitution promises universal healthcare, even though it has the lowest life
expectancy rate in the world).
196. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and
Economic Guarantees, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 65, at
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Perhaps even more importantly, fidelity to popular values may produce
documents that are overly elaborate, in that they turn all potentially appealing
values into constitutional ones. To illustrate, the 2008 Constitution of
Ecuadorwritten with widespread popular input197enshrines rights to
locally-produced nutritious food, rights for breastfeeding mothers, a right to clean
city air, along with a sweeping range of other goals.198 A number of other recent
documents in Latin America are made of similar cloth.199 Such documents are
likely to be popular, as people are typically in favor of enshrining a wide range of
appealing goals into their constitution.200 For the functionalist, however, such
documents raise concerns about the enforceability of these goals, as well as about
the appropriate role for the judiciary in a democratic society.201 Thus, functionalism
suggests caution against an overly broad catalogue of constitutional rights.
Popular self-expression can also undermine international human rights norms.
In the name of tradition and deeply held cultural values, some nations have
permitted genital mutilation, even though the practice violates core principles of
women’s equality, as defined under international law.202 In the name of culture,
90, 101–02 (expressing doubt on “whether the many constitutions containing social and
economic rights have made any difference at all ‘on the ground’”).
197. Stephan Küffner & Joshua Partlow, Voters in Ecuador Approve Constitution: New
Document Would Enhance Presidential Powers, Allow Consecutive Terms, WASH. POST,
Sept. 29, 2008, at A14 (noting that “at least 65 percent of Ecuadorans voted for the
constitution” in a public referendum); Carlo Ruiz Giraldo, Social Participation and Prior
Consultation Rights in Ecuador: An Unfinished Dream?, CONSTITUTIONNET (Aug. 28,
2013),
http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/social-participation-and-prior-consultation
-rights-ecuador-unfinished-dream (“[S]ocial participation was . . . a key feature of Ecuador’s
constitutional project both in terms of content and process.”).
198. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR art. 13 (declaring the right
to safe and permanent access to “healthy, sufficient and nutritional food” that is “preferably
produced locally and in keeping with their various identities and cultural traditions”); id. art.
43 (guaranteeing pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers the right to (1) not be
discriminated against on the basis of pregnancy in school, public, and work, (2) free and
maternal healthcare services, (3) priority protection and care for their health and life from
pregnancy to postpartum, and (4) healthcare facilities for post-pregnancy recovery and
breastfeeding); id. art. 276(4) (mandating the state to promote environmental conservation
and restoration in order to guarantee the permanent and quality access to air).
199. See King, supra note 24, at 81, 190–201 (describing how the constitutions of
Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia enshrine a radical list of values).
200. See Part IV.B (finding that constitutions with more comprehensive bills of rights
enjoy larger popular support); see also Ginsburg et al., supra note 12, at 218 (finding
empirically that constitutions produced through popular referendum “are more likely to have
virtually every category of right”); Lansberg-Rodriguez, supra note 50 (noting that an
extensive package of rights usually receives an affirmative vote in popular referenda).
201. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa 1,
3 (The Law Sch. of the Univ. of Chi., John M. Olin Law & Economics Paper Series No. 124,
2001) (noting that many critics of social and economic rights worry that these rights are
beyond judicial capabilities, and put the judiciary in charge of overseeing large-scale
bureaucratic institutions).
202. See General Recommendation No. 14: Female Circumcision, Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 9th Sess., Jan. 22–Feb. 2, 1990, U.N. Doc.
A/45/38, at 80 (June 6, 1990) (recommending that states eradicate the practice of female
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some constitutions have proclaimed group rights over individual rights203 and
reinstated traditional institutions.204 In the name of certain religious values,
women’s rights have been curtailed, and women’s ability to have an abortion has
been restricted.205 Likewise, calling upon the people’s desire for economic growth,
some leaders have prioritized socioeconomic rights over civil liberties.206 More
generally, the minority rights protected by international human rights law are easily
flouted by the wishes of the majority.
To illustrate how popular values can clash with universal rights norms, consider
the new Hungarian Constitution. Written in 2011, the document has the explicit
goal of becoming a “source of patriotism and common creed” for the Hungarian
nation.207 Not only does the document have a lengthy preamble, its substantive part
is also made short and accessible to lay readers, compared with its lengthy and
technical predecessor.208 Unlike the previous document, it protects the life of
fetuses from the moment of conception and restricts marriage to partners of
opposite sexes.209 It moreover restricts the power of the judiciary to overturn
circumcision); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res.
48/104, art. 2(a), U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/48/49, at 217 (Dec.
20, 1993) (stating that female genital mutilation is a form of violence against women).
203. See Cobbah, supra note 58, at 322, 323, 328 (describing the “African worldview” as
emphasizing “group solidarity and collective responsibility” and noting that African
Constitutions “have been everything but African”).
204. See, e.g., PROCLAMATION BY HIS MAJESTY KING SOBHUZA II [CONSTITUTION] Apr.
12, 1973 (Swaz.) (noting “that the [1968 Independence] constitution has permitted the
importation into our country of highly undesirable political practices alien to, and
incompatible with the way of life in our society . . . increasingly this element engenders
hostility, bitterness and unrest in our peaceful society”). The 1973 Proclamation abolished
parliament and reinstated the traditional institution of the Swazi King. Id.
205. There is a growing consensus that access to abortion might be required under
international human rights law. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, General Recommendation No. 26: Women Migrant Workers, ¶ 18, 42d Sess., Oct.
20–Nov. 7, 2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R (Dec. 5, 2008) (noting that
“[d]iscrimination may be especially acute in relation to pregnancy” and suggesting that
access to abortion services is required by Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW)).
206. See Kausikan, supra note 58, at 35 (suggesting that “order and stability” are
“preconditions for economic growth,” while growth is “the necessary foundation” for
fulfilling civil and political rights). For an official statement of the “Asian position” on
human rights, see World Conference on Human Rights, Mar. 29, 1993–Apr. 2, 1993, Report
of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights (“Bangkok
Declaration”), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993).
207. István Stumpf, Judge, Constitutional Court of Hung., The Birth of a New
Fundamental Law of Hungary, Keynote Address at the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2013/05/model-resource-or-outlier-what-effect-hasthe-us-constitution-had-on-the-recently-adopted-constitutions-of-other-nations.
208. Id. (“[O]ne of the main objectives of drafting a shorter . . . and easier to understand
constitution for Hungary was to make it more accessible and meaningful for average
Hungarian citizens.”).
209. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY, [CONSTITUTION] art. 2 (“[T]he life of a
foetus will be protected from the moment of conception.”); id. art. L (“Hungary shall protect
the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman.”).
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democratic legislation.210 While widely condemned by the Council of Europe and
the United States for failing to adequately protect rights,211 this “people’s
constitution” enshrines values that are reportedly held by the majority of Hungarian
people.212
Likewise, the short-lived 2012 Egyptian constitution was filled with rhetoric of
national identity and demonstrated fidelity to the Islamic values held by a majority
of Egyptians.213 Yet minority groups—most notably the Coptic community and
liberal women’s groups—were worried from the outset that the document would
not adequately protect their rights.214 Even though the document enjoyed support
from a majority of Egyptians and was approved by popular referendum, human
rights organizations strongly condemned the document for failing to protect human
rights.215 The dramatic aftermath of the document, which was abandoned the day
the newly elected President Morsi was ousted by the military, shows the danger of
documents that are all too majoritarian and fail to protect minority rights.216

210. See Hungary: Constitution Changes Warrant EU Action, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Mar.
12, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/12/hungary-constitution-changes-warrant-euaction (noting that one constitutional amendment adopted in March 2013 “[l]imit[ed] the
mandate of the Constitutional Court, preventing it from referring to its own rulings prior to
January 1, 2012, when a new constitution came into force, and ending its power to review
the substance of amendments to the constitution”).
211. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Constitutional Revolution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2011, 10:31 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/hungarys-constitutional
-revolution (describing the international criticisms of the new constitution).
212. See Hanneke van den Akker, Rozemarijn van der Ploeg & Peer Scheepers,
Disapproval of Homosexuality: Comparative Research on Individual and National
Determinants of Disapproval of Homosexuality in 20 European Countries, 25 INT’L J. PUB.
OPINION RES. 64, 71–72 (2013) (emphasizing that empirical research shows that among
twenty European countries studied, Hungary disapproves of homosexuality on a national and
an individual level more than most other European countries).
213. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Islamists Rush Through Egyptian Constitution and
Prepare to Vote on It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2012, at A6 (describing the contested provisions
in the document that is currently being written).
214. David D. Kirkpatrick, Thousands of Egyptians Protest Plan for Charter, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2012, at A6 (reporting that “[t]he crowd appeared more affluent than those at
the usual Tahir Square protests,” and that there “was an unusually high concentration of
women, especially for an event after dark, and very few traditional Islamic headscarves” as
well as “a heavy representation from Egypt’s Coptic Christian minority”).
215. See David D. Kirkpatrick & Kareem Fahim, Egypt Islamists Expect Approval of
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at A1 (“Many international experts faulted the
charter as a missed opportunity, stuffed with broad statements about Egyptian identity but
riddled with loopholes regarding the protection of rights.”); Egypt’s New Constitution
Mixed on Support for Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/29/egypt-new-constitution-mixed-support-rights;
(providing an overview of problematic articles in the Rights and Freedoms chapter of the
draft constitution).
216. Daniel Lansberg-Rodriquez, An Obituary for the Egyptian Constitution, Dec. 26,
2012–July 3, 2013, FOREIGN POL’Y, (July 3, 2013, 8:11 PM), http://transitions.foreignpolicy.
com/posts/2013/07/03/an_obituary_for_the_egyptian_constitution_dec_26_2012_july_3_2013.
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While normatively appealing from an outside perspective, functionalism and
universalism come with their own distinct set of problems. They are troubling from
the viewpoint of democratic theory when they constrain majorities without the
legitimacy of higher law-making.217 But there is also a more practical concern with
such documents. Where documents lack popular support, they are less likely to
work in practice. The experience of post-colonial constitution-making in Africa
illustrates this danger. Almost all of Britain’s former colonies in Africa, upon
independence, received the exact same bill of rights.218 These boilerplate bills of
rights had a distinctively libertarian character and emphasized negative liberty
rights, while omitting socioeconomic rights. They were technical, lawyer-drafted
documents with an exhaustive list of limitation clauses within each provision.219 In
fact, all these bills of rights were modeled after the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.220 But in most cases, they failed to deal
with the most pressing issues of the newly established African states: deep ethnic
tensions and persistent poverty. Their libertarian principles never functioned in
practice.221
This post-colonial experience relates to a long-established truism in comparative
law, which is that transplanted laws (i.e., laws exported from one country to
another) often remain a dead letter regardless of how desirable they may be on
paper.222 Transplanted laws, it has been found, suffer from a “transplant effect” that
renders them ineffective because they are unrelated to local views, traditions, and
practices.223 Functionalism and universalism in constitutional design potentially

217. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
218. See CHARLES PARKINSON, BILLS OF RIGHTS AND DECOLONIZATION 1–19 (2007)
(describing how it became Britain’s policy to require a bill of rights as part of the
negotiations for independence).
219. See id. at 250–53 (suggesting the bills of rights for the former British colonies were
“meticulously drafted” as indicated by elaborate limitation clauses).
220. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND
THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 844–73 (2004) (describing how the postcolonial bills of rights were modeled on the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms).
221. See, e.g., Charles O.H. Parkinson, The Social and Political Foundations of the
Nigerian Constitution, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 24, at 532, 533 (noting that the Nigerian independence constitution failed because
it was “unable to accommodate the fundamental social and political divisions within
Nigerian society”); Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 528, 531
(1999) (noting that the “postcolonial constitutions in Sub-Saharan Africa have largely
succumbed to irrelevance and debacle” because they were “not firmly grounded in the
cultural mores of the society in which they operate”).
222. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. INT’L
COMP. L. 111, 118–20 (1997) (suggesting that “at best, what can be displaced from one
jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words” and that “[n]o rule in the
borrowing jurisdiction can have any significance as regards the rule in the jurisdiction from
which it is borrowed” (emphasis in original)); cf. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 1–24 (1st ed. 1974) (suggesting that legal transplantation
is the primary engine of legal change).
223. Compare Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic
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contribute to such a transplant effect, or produce documents that have much to
admire on paper, but that fail to work in practice.224
In sum, where popular self-expression affects substantive constitutional choices,
real tensions can take shape. A constitution that expresses popular values may
undermine the principles of constitutional functionalism and universalism, just as a
universal or functional constitution may undermine popular self-expression. For
real-world constitutional designers, the competing logics of popular values on the
one hand, and functionalism and universalism on the other, constitute a real
dilemma that goes to the very nature of constitutions. The findings from this Article
suggest that, when confronted with this dilemma, most real-world
constitution-makers have favored functionalism and universalism over popular selfexpression.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented the first comprehensive empirical exploration of the
relationship between people’s values and their constitutions. Its main finding, that
there exists only a weak relationship between constitutional choices and popular
values, may come as a surprise to many readers. In a comparative perspective,
countries whose people attach importance to the values associated with certain
rights are no more likely to enshrine these rights in their constitution than countries
whose people do not share those values. Moreover, within any given country, there
often exists a considerable gap between constitutional choices and popular values.
This gap lacks popular support: in most cases, people do want to enshrine their
values in their constitution.
These observations contradict some of the core assumptions of contemporary
constitutional theory. As the nation’s highest legal documents, constitutions are
commonly attributed with strong democratic legitimacy.225 Especially when the
constitution serves as a basis for invalidating ordinary legislation, constitutional
theory demands that the constitution be more democratic than ordinary legislation,
or else the practice of judicial review would be hard to justify from a democratic
perspective. This Article’s findings suggest that many of the world’s constitutions
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 165 (2003)
(describing the negative effects of legal transplantation and characterizing this as “the
transplant effect”), with Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson & James A.
Robinson, The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution, 101 AM. ECON.
REV. 3286, 3304 (2011) (suggesting that “big bang” institutional reform may be conducive
to economic growth).
224. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where Does Economic Development Really
Come From? Constitutional Rule Among Contemporary Sioux and Apache, 33 ECON.
INQUIRY 402, 404 (1995) (studying the Sioux and Apache tribes and suggesting that
constitutions unrelated to preexisting institutions are ineffective); Richard A. Posner,
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RESEARCH
OBSERVER 1, 6 (1998) (noting that transplantation does not work for constitutions because
the “effectiveness” of constitutional law “depends on a particularly complex cultural and
institutional matrix”); Fredrick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 CONN.
L. REV. 907, 912 (2005) (speculating that “transplanted” constitutions may be less effective
because they are remote from local circumstances).
225. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
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fall short of this demand, and thus, that the counter-majoritarian problem remains
unresolved. On a whole, there exists little support for the claim that judicial review
channels the true will of the people as enshrined in the constitutional document.
The findings from this Article raise the question of whose values constitutions
reflect, if not those of popular majorities. On the one hand, it is possible that the
experts who draft many constitutions carefully balance popular self-expression
against more universalist and functional considerations.226 On the other hand,
constitutions could simply reflect the idiosyncratic preferences of the documents’
authors. They could also reflect the values of governing elites, for example, who
write the documents to protect their private values not shared by the general
population.227 The quantitative empirical approach in this Article merely offers a
bird’s-eye view of global constitution-making; it is unable to discern the
motivations of constitution drafters. Further research is required to explain the
puzzle of unpopular constitutionalism and to establish what kinds of values are
enforced in the name of “We the People.”
Finally, the findings from this Article also raise the question of how to
normatively evaluate the phenomenon of unpopular constitutionalism that appears
to characterize the world’s constitutions. On the one hand, constitutions that are
disconnected from popular opinion may be more prone to failure, as the British
colonial experience illustrates. Moreover, such unpopular documents are troubling
from the perspective of constitutional theories that hold that constitutions should
enjoy larger democratic legitimacy than ordinary legislation. On the other hand,
populist constitutions might come with their own set of problems. Most notably,
they might fail to protect minority rights and make choices that are undesirable
from a universalist or functionalist perspective. The grand failure of Egypt’s 2012
constitution illustrates how an overly majoritarian document can fail to protect
minority rights, and might even induce widespread civic unrest.228
Ultimately, the decision of whether to write a populist constitution entails a
weighing of the relative costs and benefits of populism versus the costs and
benefits of a disconnect from popular values. How these considerations work out
likely depends on time and place. To illustrate, countries with deep ethnic or
religious divides might consider a gap between the constitution and popular values
necessary, because a majoritarian document would fail to protect minority groups.
By contrast, more homogeneous societies might be able to reap the benefits of
populist constitutions without incurring substantial costs. It is not my goal to
develop a wholesale recommendation for all countries. Instead, my goal has been
more modest, to highlight the gap between constitutional theory and constitutional
practice. But such a modest goal might have far-reaching implications nonetheless.
Indeed, while it is still possible for constitutional scholars to argue normatively that
constitutions should reflect popular values, they can no longer assume that they
actually do.

226. See supra Part VI.
227. See HIRSCHL, supra note 148 passim (suggesting that constitutions reflect the values
of hegemonic elites who fear losing power).
228. See Lansberg-Rodriguez, supra note 216 (explaining that while Egypt’s 2012
constitution was “highly representative” of the “electorally dominant” “Islamist faction,” it
was undone by its neglect of Egypt’s minority groups).

